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The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law
Avishalom Tor*
This article examines the behavioral analysis of law, meaning the application of 
empirical behavioral evidence to legal analysis, which has become increasingly 
popular in legal scholarship in recent years. Following the introduction in Part 
I, this Article highlights four central propositions on the subject. First, Part II 
asserts that the efficacy of the law often depends on its accounting for relevant
patterns of human behavior, most notably those studied by behavioral decision 
scientists. This Part therefore reviews important behavioral findings, illustrating
their application and relevance to a broad range of legal questions. Second, 
Part III argues that the behavioral approach is empirically driven, engaging in 
both the theoretical application of extant empirical findings to the law and the
generation of new, legally relevant, experimental and observational evidence. 
As this Part shows, moreover, each of these behavioral genres possesses 
different methodological strengths and weaknesses, and they therefore both 
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substitute for and complement one another, in different respects. Third, Part 
IV explains that the behavioral approach encounters a series of “gaps” between 
the type of empirical evidence provided by behavioral decision researchers and 
the data required to resolve legal questions. Legal scholars should therefore 
be aware of these gaps, which may limit the usefulness of extant behavioral 
evidence for legal analysis. This Part also addresses what legal scholars may do 
to overcome such gaps and distinguish real gaps from imaginary ones. Fourth 
and finally, Part V argues that the behavioral analysis of law is simultaneously
normatively neutral and normatively relevant. It is normatively neutral because 
the behavioral analysis of law is not committed to any specific legal goal or value
system. This fundamental neutrality, in turn, makes the behavioral approach a 
versatile instrument, which can help generate important normative conclusions 
in the service of scholars evaluating the law based on any normative criteria – 
from justice to welfare and more. Part VI concludes. 
I. Accounting for Human Behavior. II. The Behavioral Analysis of 
Law: A. Judgment: The Formation of Beliefs: 1. Attribute Substitution 
Heuristics and Biases; 2. Information-Processing Biases; 3. Motivated 
and Egocentric Judgments. B. Choice: The Construction of Preferences: 
1. Context Dependence; 2. Framing Effects, Reference Points, and Loss 
Aversion; 3. The Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect; 4. Social 
Preferences. III. Empirical Foundations: A. Boundaries. B. Two Genres: 
1. Theoretical Applications; 2. Direct Empirical Tests; 3. Complements or 
Substitutes? IV. Basic Research Gaps: A. Shrinking Gaps: Boundary 
Conditions and Debiasing; B. Second-Order Gaps: A Multiplicity 
of Phenomena; C. Institutional Gaps: Content and Context Effects. 
V. Normative Neutrality and Normative Relevance: A. Normative 
Neutrality; B. Normative Relevance. VI. Conclusion.
I. Accounting for Human Behavior
One of the main functions of the law is the guidance of human behavior.1 Yet traditional 
legal scholarship, jurisprudence, and policy making typically rely on mere intuitions 
about human behavior to guide their decisions, rules, and proposals. Consequently, the 
1. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979) p. 163 
(discussing the functions of law). See also: Don Langevoort, “Behavioral Theories of 
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law contains numerous intuitive, often implicit, assumptions about the ways in which 
individuals process information and make judgments, form preferences and reach 
decisions, respond to incentives, and more.2 This state of affairs is problematic, inter 
alia, for two reasons: first, the lack of a clear, explicit, behavioral model inevitably
generates contradictions in the law.3 Second, a wealth of psychological research 
reveals that intuition, though indispensable, often useful, and sometimes accurate, is 
also prone to systematic error.4
Partly in response to the first problem, legal scholars have developed approaches
that make explicit the behavioral and other assumptions underlying their legal 
analyses. A prominent case in point is the economic analysis of law, which explicitly 
assumes individuals are strictly rational utility maximizers.5 These rational actors 
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review”, 51 Vand. L. 
Rev. (1998) 1499, p. 1499 (“Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predictions 
about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily”); Robert A. Prentice, “Chicago Man, 
K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics”, 56 Vand. L. Rev. (2003) 
1663, p. 1664 (“Most law is aimed at shaping human behavior, encouraging that which is 
good for society and discouraging that which is bad.”) 
2. See, e.g., Prentice, id., p. 1665 (“for most of the history of our legal system, laws were 
passed, cases were decided, and academics pontificated about the law based on nothing
more than common sense assumptions about how people make decisions.”) Cf. also the 
description of the traditional legal approach in Hans Zeisel, “Reflections on Experimental
Techniques in the Law”, 2 J. Leg. Stud. (1973) 107, p. 107 (“Much of the law’s reasoning 
turns on the effect of the rules it creates or enforces. Normally these effects are alleged or 
implied, but rarely proven.”).
3. Of course, there are many other causes for contradictions in the law, as the legal realists and 
later critical legal scholars and others have long made clear. Some illustrative examples 
include Karl N. Llewellyn, “Some Realism about Realism – Responding to Dean Pound”, 
44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) 1222, p. 1239 (“But the line of inquiry via rationalization has come 
close to demonstrating that in any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable 
the available authoritative premises ... are at least two, and that the two are mutually 
contradictory as applied to the case in hand”); Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance 
in Private Law Adjudication”, 89 Harv. L. Rev. (1976) 1685, p. 1685 (“…substantive and 
formal conflict in private law ... reflect[s] a deeper level of contradiction”).
4. See supra Part II.
5. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed. 2003) p. 3 (“The task of 
economics ... is to explore the implications of assuming that man is rational maximizer of 
his ends in life ...”) (footnotes omitted); Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis 
of Law (2004) p. 1-2 (discussing the role of the rationality assumption in descriptive 
analysis and noting that “the view taken will generally be that actors are “rational” ... 
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possess stable preferences that are revealed in their choices, obtain optimal amounts of 
information, and make unbiased judgments under uncertainty.6 Moreover, according 
to the economic convention the strictly rational legal actor typically is assumed self-
interested, his utility a function solely of his personal well-being.7
Relying on the rational-actor model, the economic approach has been able 
to reevaluate systematically one legal domain after another. It has generated an 
immense body of scholarship, fundamentally changing the nature of legal reasoning 
and impacting many specific legal rules and institutions.8 The simple and explicit
assumption of rational action enjoys the great benefits of predictability and tractability:
one can predict how a rational actor will react to any given legal rule, institution 
or incentive, and his simple utility function makes mathematical modeling more 
tractable.9
The powerful rational actor model, however, also suffers from significant limitations.
Most notably, the efficacy of any model depends on its explanatory power,10 which is
unlikely to be great when its underlying assumptions are systematically biased. A large 
forward looking and behave[ing] so as to maximize their expected utility”). For a more 
detailed review of various formulations of rational action within legal scholarship see, 
e.g., Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, “Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics”, 88 Cal. L. Rev. (2000) 1053, pp. 
1060-1066.
6. E.g., Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976) p. 14. 
7. See, e.g., Posner (supra note 5); Matthew Rabin, “Incorporating Fairness into Game 
Theory and Economics”, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. (1993) 1281, p. 1281 (“Most current 
economic models assume that people pursue only their own material self-interest and do 
not care about “social” goals”). 
8. By now, the law and economics literature is immense. Basic works include Posner (supra 
note 5); Shavell (supra note 5). See also: Handbook of Law and Economics, Vols 1 & 2 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell- eds., 2007). 
9. E.g., Posner (supra note 5) p. 17. Nevertheless, additional assumptions must be made even 
when analyzing the behavior of strictly rational legal actors, regarding their risk attitudes, 
the information available to them, and more. 
10. See: Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, Essays in Positive 
Economics (1953) pp. 3, 21-22; Allan Gibbard and Hal Varian, “Economic Models”, 
75 J. Phil. (1978) 664, pp. 669-673 (discussing the concepts of approximation and fit
in microeconomic models that are based on false assumptions). But see the somewhat 
different emphasis in George J. Stigler, “The Development of Utility Theory. II”, 58 J. 
Pol. Econ. (1950) 373, pp. 392-396 (citing generality, manageability, and congruence with 
reality as three criteria used to evaluate economic theories).
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body of empirical research nevertheless reveals that the strict rationality assumption 
is not only descriptively inaccurate, but also systematically wrong. Individuals’ 
judgments and choices exhibit behavioral regularities that deviate, predictably, from 
the patterns expected of hypothetical rational actors.11 And while the rationality 
assumption sometimes may provide a sufficiently realistic approximation, in many
legal domains a more realistic view of human behavior is an important precondition 
for effective legal analysis.12
The behavioral analysis of law,13 which has become increasingly popular in legal 
scholarship in recent years,14 responds to this need. It provides an explicit model 
11. See infra Part II.
12. See: Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, “A Behaviroal Approach 
to Law and Economics”, 50 Stan. L. Rev. (1998) 1471, pp. 1474-1475 (arguing for the 
superiority of a behaviorally-informed over a traditional law and economics analysis).
13. Notably, there is some disagreement among scholars on the appropriate name for this 
approach, although the emphasis on the “behavioral” focus of the analysis is most common. 
When examining the various proposed definitions it is important to note that not all are in
conflict with one another. For example, “Behavioral Law and Economics” may be viewed
as a combination of the behavioral analysis of law with the normative foundations of law 
and economics. For some definitions see: Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, “Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation”, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (1999) 
630 (Law and behavioralism); Joll, Sunstein and Thaler, id. (A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics); Cass R. Sunstein, “Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress 
Report”, 1 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. (1999) 115 (Behavioral Law and Economics); Gregory 
Mitchell, “Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New 
Behavioral Analysis of Law”, 43 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. (2002) 1907, p. 1915 n. 12 (Legal 
decision theory); Prentice (supra note 1) p. 1667 (describing “a movement, variously 
called Behavioral Law and Economics (BLE), Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), and 
Legal Decision Theory (LDT), that seeks to provide a more descriptively and predictively 
accurate account of human behavior”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “The “New” Law and 
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters”, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 
(2000) 739 (offering the title of “New” law and psychology and explaining why names 
that include a “behavioral” component may be misleading). See also: Christoph Engel, 
“Behavioral Law and Economics: Comment”, Behavioral Economics and its Applications 
(Peter Diamond and Hannu Veriainen- ed., 2007) 148, pp. 149-153 (distinguishing 
behavioral law and ecnomics from law and psychology). 
14. E.g., Mitchell, id., p. 1909-1910 and n. 5-6; Sunstein, id., p. 115 (describing a “flood” of
behaviorally-oriented legal research already in 1999). For some additional reviews and 
broad applications of behavioral findings to the law see, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler
(supra note 12); Korobkin and Ulen (supra note 5); Langevoort (supra note 1) (showing the 
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of legally relevant behavior, based on empirical research instead of intuition or 
theory alone. Drawing on the extensive findings of behavioral decision research,
the psychology of judgment and decision making (JDM), and related fields,15 the
behavioral approach thus provides an empirically-based middle ground between the 
theoretical abstractions of the rational-actor model and the implicit, intuitive, and 
unstructured view of human behavior of traditional legal scholarship.
Specifically, behavioral decision research emphasizes that humans possess limited
cognitive resources and are affected by motivation and emotion – that is, they are 
“boundedly rational.”16 At times they engage in formal, effortful, and time-consuming 
judgment and decision making.17 More commonly, however, to survive and function 
in a complex world individuals use mental and emotional heuristics when making 
judgments under uncertainty; they also rely extensively on situational cues to guide 
their choices. Yet while highly adaptive and often useful,18 heuristic judgment and cue-
broad range of behavioral applications in the legal literature as of decade ago, even before 
this approach has become widely popular in the legal literature). 
15. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, “Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment”, The Handbook 
of Social Psychology (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey- eds., 1998) 
497 (hereinafter “Dawes, Handbook”). For one useful summary description of the field
and its development see: William M. Goldstein and Robin M. Hogarth, “Judgment and 
Decision Research: Some Historical Context”, Research on Judgment and Decision 
Making: Currents, Connections, and Controversies (William M. Goldstein and Robin M. 
Hogarth – eds., 1997).
16. The concept of bounded rationality was originally developed by Herbert A. Simon. See: 
Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, 69 Q. J. Econ. (1956) 99; 
Herbert A. Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment”, 63 Psychol. 
Rev. (1958) 129. In Simon’s terminology, however, bounded rationality denoted only the 
cognitive limitations of the human mind, while the present usage is broader, referring to 
the various inherent limitations of human judgment and decision making, See: Avishalom 
Tor, “The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy”, 101 
Mich. L. Rev. (2002) 482, p. 485 and n. 4 (explaining this broader usage of the term). See 
also: Douglas MacLean, “Some Morals of a Theory of Nonrational Choice”, Judgment, 
Decisions and Public Policy (Rajeev Gowda and Jeffrey C. Fox – eds., 2002) 46, p. 48 
(arguing that psychological evidence on nonrational judgment and decision behavior 
present a qualitatively deeper challenge to the rationality assumption than the one posed 
by Simon’s early bounded rationality view).
17. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the boundary between intuitive and formal judgment and 
decision making). 
18. See, e.g., Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard 
Selten – eds., 2001), John W. Payne, James R. Bettman and Eric J. Johnson, The Adaptive 
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dependent choice also lead decision makers systematically and predictably to deviate 
from the normative standards of strictly rational behavior.19
The behavioral approach seeks to infuse the law with this more realistic view of 
legally relevant behavior.20 One may therefore define the behavioral analysis of law
as the application of empirical behavioral evidence to the analysis of legal rules and 
institutions. The proposed definition captures four central aspects of the approach
that this Article examines in some detail. First, the behavioral analysis of law asserts 
that the efficacy of the law depends on its accounting for relevant patterns of human
behavior, identified by behavioral decision scientists and other researchers. Second, this
approach is empirically driven, engaging in both the theoretical application of extant 
empirical findings and the generation of new experimental evidence of legal relevance.
Third, the behavioral analysis of law faces a series of challenges, or “application 
gaps,” between basic research findings and applied legal questions. Until these gaps
are bridged, the utility and explanatory power of the behavioral approach in many legal 
domains may remain limited. Fourth, the behavioral analysis of law is an instrumental, 
normatively neutral, approach, which seeks to provide better understanding of the 
myriad interactions between law and behavior without a commitment to any particular 
value system.21 Behavioral insights may therefore enrich any argument that implicates 
legally relevant behavior, but cannot generate normative conclusions without drawing 
on the analyst’s other value commitments.22
Based on these four propositions regarding the main methodological characteristics 
of the behavioral analysis of law, the remainder of the Article delineates the approach, 
then evaluates its accomplishments, potential, challenges, and limitations. Part II 
Decision Maker (1993) 2. (developing the thesis that the use of heuristics and varying 
decision strategies “is an adaptive response of a limited-capacity information processor to 
the demands of complex decision tasks”). 
19. See infra Parts II.A. and II.B. (reviewing findings on judgment and choice, respectively).
20. The behavioral seeks to account for the behavior of all legally-relevant actors, within and 
without the legal system. Note, moreover, that one could also apply behavioral insights 
to the study of legal scholars and legal scholarship itself. See, e.g, Matthew D. Adler, 
“Bounded Rationality and Legal Sscholarship” (University of Pennsylvania Institute 
for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-03, February 2008) (available at [http:
//ssrn.com/abstract=1095874]) (arguing that boundedly rational legal scholars would be 
unable fully to implement any normative analysis that includes social welfare as one of its 
criteria).
21. Except possibly insofar as the belief in the legal importance of accounting for human 
behavior is concerned. For a further discussion see infra Part V. 
22. See infra Part V.
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summarizes some basic JDM findings and illustrates their legal application, while
Part III examines the main methodologies employed by behaviorally oriented legal 
scholars. Part IV considers some of the most significant challenges, or application
gaps, facing the behavioral analysis of law at present. Part V follows with an analysis 
of the normative dimension of the behavioral approach; Part VI concludes.
II. The Behavioral Analysis of Law
The first theme developed in this Article is that the efficacy of the law depends on
its accounting for relevant patterns of human behavior, notably those identified by
behavioral decision researchers, judgment and decision making psychologists, and 
others. This research usefully may be classified into two general domains of judgment
and decision making (or “choice”),23 also known in economic parlance as beliefs 
and preferences, respectively.24 The study of judgment is concerned with intuitive 
judgments, namely mental processes that are neither completely automatic nor 
elaborate and controlled. 25 When considering a complex logical problem that is printed 
on a sheet of paper, for instance, such judgments occupy the middle ground between 
the automatic visual perception of the problem printed on the sheet and the conscious, 
formal, reasoning process required to solve it. In this example, intuitive judgments 
may concern matters such as rough estimates of the answer to the problem, a quick 
prediction of the time needed to solve it, or an immediate evaluation of the apparent 
difficulty of the problem. Moreover, the study of intuitive judgment is characterized by
a focus on how people make judgments – which are all essentially probabilistic26 – to 
23. For a similar distinction see, e.g., Dawes (supra note 15) pp. 497-499 (choice), 530-533 
(judgment). See also: Mitchell (supra note 13) n. 20 (making a similar distinction based on 
the conventions of behavioral decision research and discussing it at length).
24. E.g., Nicholas Barberis and Richard H. Thaler, “A Survey of Behavioral Finance”, 2 
Advances in Behavioral Finance (Richard H. Thaler- ed., 2005) 1, pp.12-22 (dividing 
relevant psychological findings among the domains of beliefs and preferences); Colin F.
Camerer, “Individual Decision Making”, Handbook of Experimental Economics (John H. 
Kagel and Alvin E. Roth – eds., 1995) 587 (same).
25. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, “Representativeness Revisited: 
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment”, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of 
Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman- eds., 2002)
49, p. 50 (hereinafter “Heuristics and Biases”). See also: Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, 
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980) (comparing 
intuitive inferences with the requirements of formal reasoning).
26. Since judgments about outcomes also may be recast as probabilistic judgments. For 
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form their beliefs about the world. The study of decision making, on the other hand, 
examines how individuals choose among the alternatives available to them, choices 
that economists consider the expression of preferences.27 
Parts II.A. and II.B. therefore examine the main psychological findings in these two
domains, respectively, also illustrating their relevance for the law through a series of 
applications in a variety of legal areas.28
A. Judgment: The Formation of Beliefs
Individuals make daily a multitude of legally relevant judgments of future, past, and 
present events under conditions of uncertainty. They predict the future outcomes of 
an election or the performance of a business venture; make determinations regarding 
past events – such as whether a defendant who injured a plaintiff likely has behaved 
negligently; and judge how likely a particular tract of land presently is to be sitting 
over an oil reservoir. Such judgments require individuals – at least implicitly – to 
assess the probability of different outcomes, a task for which they use a variety of 
heuristic tools.
1. Attribute Substitution Heuristics and Biases
In the domain of judgment, boundedly rational decision makers often use attribute 
substitution – that is, when confronted with a difficult question they may answer
instead an easier one whose answer comes more readily to mind. For instance, 
a person who is asked “How dangerous is the intersection near your home?” 
may answer as if she were asked how many accidents or near-accidents at that 
intersection she can readily recall.29 The substitution of a proxy for a sought-after 
attribute facilitates and simplifies judgment and thus serves a crucial function for the
boundedly rational decision maker; such proxies, however, are inevitably inaccurate, 
example, judgments of outcomes such as the time required for or the difficulty of solving
a problem may be recast as judgments of the likelihood that the solution will taken certain 
amounts of time or of the probability of reaching the correct solution.
27. See, e.g., Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics – Or How Economists Explain (2d 
ed. 1992) pp. 142-144 (providing a short, non-technical overview of revealed preferences 
theory). See also: infra note 83 and the accompanying text.
28. The reader should treat the examples that follow as no more than illustrations meant to 
highlight the potential of behavioral evidence to contribute to legal scholarship, rather 
than a complete analysis of the various topics used in these illustrations. In many cases, 
however, the sources referenced in the relevant footnotes will provide a more extensive 
analysis of specific topics for interested readers.
29. E.g., Kahneman and Frederick (supra note 25) p. 51.
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leading to predictable errors.30 The following sections thus review and apply three 
general-purpose heuristics: the representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, 
and the affect heuristic. 
a) The Representativeness Heuristic
Legally relevant judgments often require an assessment of the likelihood that an 
instance or an event31 belongs to a certain class or has originated from or caused 
another event. One may be asked to determine, for instance, whether a criminal 
defendant is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Decision makers typically 
answer such questions based on the degree to which the judged instance – in this case, 
defendant – resembles the class of offenders. This judgmental process, known as the 
representativeness heuristic, substitutes the degree to which an event resembles a class 
for the actual likelihood that it belongs to that class.32 
Judgment based on similarity or representativeness is relatively easy, and is usually 
correlated with the actual probability of the judged event. The common reliance on 
this proxy, however, also leads to systematic errors because various factors affect 
probability but not similarity, and vice versa. For instance, the base-rate frequency 
of the judged outcomes affects probability, but not similarity.33 To illustrate, where 
the base-rate frequency of lawyers among one hundred participants in a personality-
test study is 30%, with engineers comprising the other 70%, any random personality 
test from the study is more likely to belong to an engineer than to a lawyer. Because 
similarity is not affected by base rates, however, people would judge a brief description 
of a test-taking individual that more closely resembles the stereotype of a lawyer 
30. Id., p. 53. See also: Rachlinski (supra note 13) p. 17 (also noting decision makers typically 
are unaware of their use of heuristics).
31. In probability theory, “event” means any state of the world to which one can assign 
a probability including, for instance, a physical object, a person, or behavior. See, e.g., 
Robin Hogarth, Judgment and Choice (2d ed., 1987) p. 237.
32. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness”, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky – eds., 1982) 32, pp. 39-40. (herinafter 
“Judgment Under Uncertainty”). See also Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 
“Judgments of and by Representativeness”, Judgment Under Uncertainty; id., 84, pp. 
85-88 (elaborating on the representativeness relation).
33. Tversky and Kahneman, Subjective Probability, id. (also describing various additional 
variables that impact probability but not representativeness, including sample size, 
predictability, and more).
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than that of an engineer as highly likely to belong to a lawyer, regardless of the two 
professions’ base rate in the study.34 
In the law, the neglect of base-rate information in the face of other, anecdotal 
but highly representative, evidence thus suggests that courts may under-incorporate 
“hard,” scientific, base-rate facts provided by expert witnesses.35 This effect of
representativeness can also help explain the rule that “character evidence” is generally 
inadmissible in a trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted.36 Because of the 
character-evidence rule, for example, a prosecutor may not introduce evidence that 
a criminal defendant charged with murder has a previous record of conviction for 
armed robbery.37 The conventional explanation for the rule – that a defendant should 
not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds – is 
somewhat puzzling. Logically, character evidence is relevant, since violent felons are 
more likely than the average person to commit murder. Character evidence, however, 
may increase a defendant’s representativeness – making the former armed robber look 
more like a stereotypical murderer. In addition, this evidence may also lead the court to 
ignore the base-rate fact that armed robbers mostly are not murderers, thereby causing 
an unjustified increase in the likelihood of conviction.38
34. See: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “On the Psychology of Prediction”, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) 48, pp. 53-54. 
35. Michael J. Saks and Robert F. Kidd, “Human Information Processing and Adjudciation: 
Trial by Heuristics”, 15 L. & Soc. Rev. (1980) 123, pp. 148-149. Ironically, however, 
uninformed of the behavioral findings, courts and commentators historically have
expressed precisely the opposite concern – that mathematical and statistical evidence 
may be unduly persuasive. See, e.g., the famous case of People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 
319, 320, 438 P.2d 33 (1968) (“[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized 
society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not [be allowed to] 
cast a spell over him.”); Laurence Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in 
the Legal Process”, 84 Harv. L. Rev. (1971) 1329, p. 1334 (asserting that mathematical 
arguments may be given “a credence they may not deserve and a weight they cannot 
logically claim”). Of course, some types of statistical evidence may be over-weighted by 
courts in certain circumstances. Representativeness, however, likely leads more frequently 
to an under-incorporation effect.
36. Fed. R. Evid. 404 (1998).




b) The Availability Heuristic
Availability is another attribute-substitution heuristic of general relevance, often used in 
assessments of the frequency of a class or the probability of events. Judgment by availability 
relies on people’s better and faster recall of instances of large classes than of less common 
classes; on their finding it easier to imagine likely occurrences than unlikely ones; and on
the reinforcement of associative mental connections when two events frequently co-occur. 
When judging by availability, therefore, individuals substitute the ease of mental retrieval, 
construction, or association for a direct estimation of the actual numerosity of a class, the 
likelihood of an event, or frequency at which events co-occur.39
Like other attribute substitution heuristics, availability-based judgments are rapid 
and effortless; decision makers are therefore usually unaware of the processes they use 
to reach these judgments. Judgments by availability also generate predictable errors, 
because some variables impact availability, but not probability and frequency, while 
other variables affect the latter but not availability. For example, factors that make 
instances easier to retrieve without changing their true probability lead to a systematic 
overestimation in availability-driven judgments.40 Hence, people generally have 
reasonable estimates of the relative lethality of various potential causes of death (e.g. 
motor vehicle accidents, cancer, etc.). At the same time, they systematically misestimate 
the frequency of those death causes that tend to be under- or over-publicized. Accidents 
are overestimated, being judged to cause as many fatalities as diseases, while the latter 
in fact cause about 16 times more deaths. Similarly, the risk of homicide is dramatically 
overestimated, while the risk of death by stroke is underestimated. In general, 
overestimated causes of death tend to be more dramatic and sensational, and thus both 
heavily publicized by the media and easier to recall per se. Underestimated risks, on 
the other hand, tend to be unspectacular events, which claim one victim at a time, are 
common also in non-fatal form, and do not receive much publicity.41
39. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases”, Judgment Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) 3, p. 11-14. See also: Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability”, Judgment Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) 163 (exploring different types 
of judgments by availability). See also: Norbert Schwarz and Leigh Ann Vaughn, “The 
Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources 
of Information”, Heuristics and Biases (supra note 25) 103, p. 118 (disentangling two 
potential mechanisms underlying the effects of availability and concluding that ease of 
recall is the mechanism of more general relevance).
40. E.g., Tversky and Kahneman, Availability, id.
41. See: Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, “Facts Versus Fears: 
Understanding Perceived Risk, Judgment Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) 463, pp. 
465-472.
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The legal importance of accounting for availability-driven biases is apparent. Such 
biases lead the public to overestimate some risks, occasionally creating excessive 
demands for regulation.42 Availability biases are also important in other legal domains. 
For instance, the economic analysis of law assumes criminal deterrence can be equally 
achieved by increasing the magnitude or the probability of the sanction.43 Moreover, 
since increasing enforcement efforts tends to be more costly than increasing the 
severity of sanctions, the latter is generally assumed a more efficient deterrence
strategy.44 If criminals exhibit availability biases, however, these conclusions may 
change. For one, an increased frequency of enforcement may be more available to 
criminals than an increased severity of punishment, say, because criminals observe 
heightened police activity but are not privy to the distribution of sanctions. If this 
were the case, increased enforcement might provide more, instead of less, efficient
deterrence than the increased severity of punishment.45
c) The Affect Heuristic
People often make judgments based on affective reactions. In these situations, they 
substitute affective “tags” associated with the targets of judgment for the direct 
evaluation of these targets.46 This affect heuristic simplifies judgmental processes
by consulting readily available affective impressions, utilizing affective shortcuts 
much like the cognitive shortcuts used by representativeness and availability.47 
42. Typical examples occur in the area of anecdote-driven environmental regulation that 
follows highly publicized events, such as the cases of Agent Orange or asbestos in schools. 
See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) pp. 1518-1522 (providing more detail). 
See also: W. Kip Viscusi and Jane T. Hamilton, “Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence 
from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions”, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. (1999) 1010 (examining 
empirical evidence for the impact of behavioral biases, inter alia, on environmental 
regulators’ decisions). 
43. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, 76 J. Pol. 
Econ. (1967) 169; Steven Shavell, “Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary 
Sanctions as a Deterrent”, 85 Colum. L. Rev. (1985) 1232, p. 1235.
44. E.g., Shavell (supra note 5) p. 484 (“One of the basic insights that applies to optimal 
law enforcement ... is that a low probability – high magnitude sanction policy is socially 
advantages”).
45. See: Korobkin and Ulen (supra note 5) pp. 1088-1089 (examining the implications of 
availability biases for the optimal deterrence model in some detail). 
46. Kahneman and Frederick (supra note 25) pp. 56-57 (noting that “[a]ffective valence is a 
natural assessment, and therefore a candidate for substitution in the numerous situations in 
which an affectively loaded response is required”). 
47. See: Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic and Stephen M. Johnson, “The Affect 
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In these cases, decision makers’ evaluations of outcome are largely dependent on 
whether the outcomes are tagged as affectively “positive” or “negative.” For instance, 
studies suggest that when judgments are based on affective reactions variations in the 
probability of different outcomes matter relatively little.48 Hence, affect-rich outcomes 
yield a significant overweighting of small probabilities.49 Much as in the case of the
availability heuristic, this impact of affect can lead to excessive public demand for 
the regulation of risks that have very low probabilities but generate strong negative 
affect.50 Typical examples may include demands for regulation of environmental 
hazards that generate a strongly negative affective reaction.51
The affect heuristic may well play a role in the courtroom as well. For instance, the 
likelihood of a decision favoring a given party may increase or decrease depending on 
the affective reaction the party generates in court.52 Researchers have also shown that 
punitive damage awards reflect juries’ outrage – that is, their affective reaction to the
facts of the case.53 Litigators and legal policy makers in the tort area should therefore 
take into account the likely disregard by juries of some legally significant factors, such
as the ex-ante probabilities of harm, detection, or compensation in the face of affect-
laden evidence.54
People also rely on the affect heuristic when assessing the risks and benefits of
different activities, such as nuclear power or cigarette smoking. Judgments of the risks 
and benefits of hazards therefore are often negatively correlated, such that people deem
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits”, 13 J. Behav. Dec. Making (2000) 1; Paul
Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters and Donald G. MacGregor, “The Affect Heuristic”, 
Heuristics and Biases (supra note 25) 397. 
48. See, e.g., Yuval Rottenstreich and Christopher K. Hsee, “Money, Kisses, and Electric 
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk”, 12 Psychol. Sci. (2001) 185, p. 188. See 
also: George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber and Christopher K. Hsee, “Risk as Feelings”, 
127 Psychol. Bull (2001) 267.
49. Rottenstreich and Hsee, id.
50. See: Cass R. Sunstein, “Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law”, 112 Yale 
L. J. (2002) 61, pp. 87-91 [hereinafter “Probability Neglect”] (also noting that affect-
driven judgments may contribute to inconsistencies in the administrative regulation of 
different risks).
51. See, e.g., Sunstein, Probability Neglect, id., p. 69 (discussing how excess public demand 
due to affective over-reaction can drive regulation). 
52. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking”, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
(2006) 933, pp. 942-943 and the evidence cited there.
53. Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade and Cass R. Sunstein, “Shared Outrage and Erratic 
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages”, 16 J. Risk & Uncertain (1998) 49.
54. See: Sunstein, Probability Neglect (supra note 50) p. 101.
250 251
low-risk those activities they consider beneficial, such as vaccinations, and high-risk
those activities they believe are not beneficial.55 Consequently, some scholars have
argued for imposing increased liability or otherwise regulating manufacturers that use 
advertising to increase the positive affect associated with harmful products, such as 
cigarettes, and thereby reduce consumers’ perceptions of the risks of these products.56
 
2. Information-Processing Biases
Boundedly rational actors also exhibit systematic biases beyond attribute substitution 
heuristics. These additional biases result from certain characteristics of common 
cognitive information-processing mechanisms. Two typical examples, which are 
reviewed in the following sections, are anchoring and adjustment and the hindsight 
bias.
a) Anchoring and Adjustment 
In many situations decision makers make estimates by starting from an initial value, 
based on information provided by the environment or a partial computation, then adjust 
the estimate to reach their final answer. Studies reveal, however, that these adjustments
typically are insufficient, so that different starting points lead to different estimates that
are biased toward the initial value, or “anchor.”57 Importantly, insufficient adjustment
occurs even for anchors that are obviously irrelevant, patently wrong or extreme.58 In a 
famous early illustration of this effect, researchers showed two groups of participants 
the results of spinning a roulette wheel, and asked two consecutive questions. The first
asked whether the percentage of African countries in the UN was higher (for the first
group, which observed the number “10” on the wheel) or lower (for the second group, 
which observed the number “65” on the wheel) than the supposedly randomly generated 
number on the wheel. The second question, which followed immediately, then asked 
participants to give their best estimates of the percentage of African countries in the 
UN. Revealing a significant anchoring effect for this patently irrelevant and randomly
generated anchor, the mean estimates of the two groups were 25% and 45% for the low 
and high anchors respectively.
55. Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson (supra note 47). 
56. Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, “Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence 
of Market Manipulation”, 112 Harv. L. Rev. (1999) 1420, pp. 1467-1565.
57. See, e.g., Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein, “Comparison of Bayesian and Regression 
Approaches in the Study of Information Processing in Judgment”, 6 Org. Behav. & Hum. 
Perform (1971) 649; Tversky and Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertianty (supra note 
32) pp. 14-18. 
58. Tversky and Kahneman, id., p. 14.
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For anchoring to occur, moreover, decision makers must note the anchor, but need 
not be aware they are anchoring on it.59 In fact, recent research has shown anchoring 
effects even for clearly incidental environmental anchors, which resulted in biased 
estimates of athletes’ performance due to the numbers on their clothing; estimates of 
the proportion of sales in the domestic market were influenced by a product’s model
number; and even participants’ estimates of how much they would spend at a restaurant 
were influenced by whether the restaurant was named ‘‘Studio 17’’ or ‘‘Studio 97.’’60
Anchoring has even been shown to affect professional decision makers in their domain 
of expertise,61 and to bias not only numerical and quantitative judgments, but also 
other evaluations in social settings.62 
Anchoring and adjustment can produce significant biases in the legal domain.
Studies show, for example, how plaintiff’s damages demand can anchor jury 
judgments.63 Similarly, telling jurors to consider verdicts in an order that begins with 
the harshest and proceeds to the most lenient – a standard murder trial practice – leads 
to harsher average verdicts than when they are told to consider verdicts in the opposite 
order.64 Damage caps – which are supposed to limit excessive awards but not impact 
other awards – have also been shown to produce anchoring effects, on both jury awards 
59. For one review of anchoring conditions see: Gretchen B. Chapman and Eric J. Johnson, 
“Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in judgments of Belief and Value”, Heuristics and 
Biases (supra note 25) 120, pp. 123-26 See also: Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, 
“Putting the Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic”, 12 Psych. Sci. 
(2001) 391, pp. 391-392.
60. Clayton R. Critcher and Thomas Gilovich, Incidental Environmental Anchors, J. Behav. 
Dec. Making (forthcoming 2008) (available online at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com
/journal/90511323/issue).
61. See, e.g., Joyce and Biddle, “Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic Inference in 
Auditing”, 19 J. Account Res. (1981) 120 (accountants); Gregory Northcraft and Margaret 
Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring and Adjustment Perspective on 
Property Pricing Decisions”, 39 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Process. (1987) 84 (real estate 
brokers). See also: Critcher and Gilovich, id. (finding in Study 1 that anchoring effects
were not qualified by participants’ expertise in the relevant domain).
62. See: Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People (1999) pp. 103-105 
(discussing anchoring and social judgment).
63. See: Edie Greene and Brian H. Bornstein, Determining Damages: The Psychology of Jury 
Awards (2003) pp. 152-154 (effect of plaintiff’s demand).
64. Jeff Greenberg, Kipling D. Williams and Mary K. O’Brien, “Considering the Harshest 
Verdict First: Biasing Effects on Mock Juror Verdicts”, 12 Person & Soc. Psych. Bull. 
(1986) 41.
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and settlements.65 Importantly, moreover, a recent meta-analysis found that anchoring 
even exerts a powerful effect on negotiated outcomes, which commonly occur in legal 
settings, also revealing that neither the availability of relevant information nor the 
negotiating decision makers’ expertise did much to diminish the anchoring effect.66
b) Hindsight Bias
Another much-studied bias that results from information-processing mechanisms is 
the hindsight bias. With hindsight, people overestimate the predictability of past events 
– both overstating their ability to have predicted past events and believing others 
should have been able to predict these events.67 Research suggests that this bias results 
from the automatic updating of beliefs following the processing of new information. 
All estimates thereafter, including those of past predictability, are based on the updated 
beliefs. Past predictability, which should have been judged on the basis of the more 
limited, pre-update, information, is therefore systematically overestimated.68
The hindsight bias has clear implications for the law. For one, because of the bias 
decision makers may be held liable for outcomes they could not have predicted.69 
65. E.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt and Christina A. Studebaker, “Anchoring in the Courtroom: 
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages”, 23 Law & Hum Behav. (1999) 353, pp. 357-
367 (finding upward or downward bias compared to a no-cap control, depending on cap
magnitude).
66. Dan Orr and Chris Guthrie, “Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New 
Insights from Meta-Analysis”, 21 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. (2006) 597, p. 597.
67. For the first description of the effect see: Baruch Fischhoff, “Hindsight Does Not Equal
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty”, 1 J. Exp. 
Psych (1975) 288. For a thorough review of the literature on this bias at the time see: 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight”, 65 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. (1998) 571, pp. 576-586 (hereinafter “Hindsight Bias”). See also: Rebecca 
L. Guilbault, Fred B. Bryant, Jennifer Howard Brockway and Emil J. Posavac, “A Meta-
Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias”, 26 Basic and App. Soc. Psych (2004) 103 
(providing a meta-analytic review of 95 hindsight bias studies containing 252 independent 
effect sizes).
68. See e.g., Ulrich Hoffrage, Ralph Hertwig and Gred Gigerenzer, “Hindsight Bias: A By-
Product of Knowledge Updating?”, 26 J. Experim. Psych.: Learn., Mem., & Cog. (2000) 
566, pp. 577-579 (also noting the adaptive nature of knowledge updating in memory and 
the extreme demands involved in remembering one’s continually changing past beliefs).
69. E.g., Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Ex Post [not =] Ex Ante: Determining 
Liability in Hindsight”, 19 L. & Hum. Behav. (1995) 89, p. 101; Susan J. LaBine and Gary 
LaBine, “Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias”, 20 L. & Hum. Behav. 
(1996) 501 (both examining the effect of the bias on liability determinations).
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This potential effect of the hindsight bias may sometimes lead people to take a costly, 
excessive level of care, to avoid negligence liability.70 Ironically, however, the 
widespread and robust effects of the bias suggest that the various actors in the legal 
system may consider biased outcomes fair, while interventions aimed at reducing the 
effects of the bias on legal decisions may appear to be favoring tort defendants.71 More 
generally, the legal system may have partly adapted to the bias in some domains.72 One 
can find, for instance, adaptations of certain substantive law rules that take into account
the ex-ante, pre-update, state of affairs, or even limit the imposition of liability in 
hindsight altogether.73 In other legal domains, however, courts apparently have failed 
to adapt to the effects of the bias, applying rules and doctrines that lead to the excessive 
imposition of liability in hindsight.74
3. Motivated and Egocentric judgments
Decision makers’ judgments are also systematically affected by motivation and 
emotion, even beyond their reliance on affective tags as an attribute substitution 
heuristic.75 Individuals’ beliefs are colored by their preferences, and they are often 
overoptimistic, overestimating their own positive traits, abilities, and skills, as well 
as the likelihood of their experiencing positive events.76 At the same time, people also 
70. For a discussion of the implications of the bias for the economic analysis of tort liability 
see: Rachlinski, Hindsight Bias (supra note 67) pp. 596-600 (discussing the conditions 
under which the bias may lead to inefficient levels of care).
71. Id., pp. 600-602. See also: Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, “Debiasing through 
Law”, 35 J. Leg. Stud. (2006) 199 (discussing possible debiasing mechanisms and 
their limitations). See also: infra Part IV.A. (examining the question of debiasing more 
generally).
72. But the general procedures the law typically relies on to avoid biased judgments are 
unlikely to be effective in battling the hindsight bias. See: Rachlinski, Hindsight Bias 
(supra note 67) pp. 602-607. 
73. Id., 607-18. See also: Mitu Gulati Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Donald C. Langevoort, “Fraud 
by Hindsight”, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. (2004) 773 (arguing that judges rely on the bias to justify 
a securities law doctrine disfavoring plaintiffs, which in fact provide judges’ with greater 
leeway to manage complex securities cases).
74. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?”, 79 Or. L. Rev. (2000) 61, pp. 70-81 (providing examples of both adaptations 
to the bias and a lack thereof).
75. Supra notes 16-17 and the accompanying text. For a general introductory discussion of 
these processes see: Kunda (supra note 62) pp. 211-263 (1999).
76. See e.g., Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown, “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social 
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health”, 103 Psychol Bull. (1988) 193; Shelley E. 
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underestimate the degree to which they are vulnerable to various risks.77 As a result of 
such overoptimism, for instance, individuals may not take sufficient precautions when
engaging in risky activities, like driving.
 In addition to overoptimism, decision makers exhibit egocentric or motivated 
reasoning: for instance, they invest ambiguous information with the meaning or 
implications they would prefer it to have,78 and display judgments of fairness that 
are biased towards their own self interest. Such egocentric biases have obvious 
ramifications for the analysis of litigation and settlement. For example, both field data
Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown, “Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited: Separating 
Fact from Fiction”, 116 Psychol Bull. (1994) 21, pp. 22-23 (reviewing and discussing 
findings on individuals’ mildly distorted positive perceptions); Neil D. Weinstein,
“Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events”, 39 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 
(1980) 806.
77. E.g., Weinstein id.; Neil D. Weinstein and William M. Klein, “Unrealistic Optimism: 
Present and Future“, 15 J. Soc. & Clinical Psychol. (1996) 1, pp. 1-6 (both articles 
discussing findings showing, inter alia, that people think themselves invulnerable to
certain risks). For some pertinent recent findings, see: Valerie A. Clarke, Hildegarde
Lovegrove, Amanda Williams and Michelle Machperson, “Unrealistic Optimism and the 
Health Belief Model”, 23 J. Behav. Med. (2000) 367, pp. 372-374 (healthy subjects exhibit 
optimistic bias, including in judgments of the expected risk and severity of cancer).
78. See: Scott T. Allison, David M. Messick and George R. Goethals, “On Being Better But Not 
Smarter than Others: The Muhammad Ali Effect”, 7 Soc. Cognition (1989) 275 (especially 
studies 2 and 3); David Dunning, Marianne Perie and Amber L. Story, “Self-Serving 
Prototypes of Social Categories”, 61 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. (1991) 957 (showing 
how people judge positive traits to be overwhelmingly more characteristic of themselves 
than negative attributes; define personal attributes in idiosyncratic ways that emphasize
their perceived strengths; and exhibit a great bias when they can choose the dimension 
on which to focus their judgment); Marsha T. Gabriel, Joseph W. Critelli and Jullana 
S. Ee, “Narcissistic Illusions in Self-Evaluations of Intelligence and Attractiveness”, 
62 J. Personality (1994) 143 (finding a medium correlation between participants’ self-
rated intelligence and their performance on objective measures and no correlation at all 
between self-rated and other measures of attractiveness,); Leigh Thompson and George 
Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51
Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes (1992) 176, pp.184-196 (especially 
Experiment 2); Judith Weiner Regan, Holly Gosselink and Janet Hubsch, “Do People 
Have Inflated Views of Their Own Ability?”, 31 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. (1975)
295, p. 295 (“Self-esteem needs must be aroused in a situation in which distortion of 
one’s ability level is possible”). For a more in-depth discussion of the role of ambiguity in 
overoptimism and related phenomena see: Tor (supra note 16) pp. 524-528.
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and experimental studies show how decision makers’ interpretations of legal evidence 
are biased by their designation as plaintiffs or defendants. Importantly, moreover, these 
biases are found not only in judgments of the “correct” legal outcomes of the case, but 
also in predictions of the judgment an impartial judge would make, as well as in what 
constitutes a “fair” settlement offer by the other party in litigation. Not surprisingly, 
these biases have also been linked to bargaining impasse, even where both parties 
possess the same information about the case at hand – a condition under which rational 
actors are expected to settle.79
Other egocentric biases bear implications for legal analysis as well. A number of 
phenomena, for example, indicate that decision makers tend to align their expectations 
about the outcomes of events with their preferences about these outcomes.80 This is 
clearly true in situations where people have a measure of control over outcomes, as in 
the case of marriage. But the evidence also reveals that preferences bias expectations 
even in settings where decision makers have no control over outcomes. In this type 
of situations people tend to overestimate the likelihood and degree of success of the 
79. For example, participants in a recent study who where designated either “plaintiffs” or 
“defendants,” exhibited systematically biased expectations of the decision an objective 
judge would arrive at in a tort case, each group in accordance with its designation, although 
their roles were merely ad hoc designations and they had no opportunity to address the 
judge. George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer and Linda Babcock, 
“Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining”, 22 J. Legal Stud. (1993) 
135, p. 151, tbl.2; see also: Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff and 
Colin Camerer, “Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining”, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. (1995) 
1337.
80. See, e.g., Elisha Babad, “Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Among Sports Fans”, 2 Soc. 
Behav. (1987) 231; Elisha Babad and Yosi Katz, “Wishful Thinking – Against All Odds”, 
21 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. (1991) 1921; David V. Budescu and Meira Bruderman, “The 
Relationship Between the Illusion of Control and the Desirability Bias”, 8 J. Behav. 
Decision Making (1995) 109; Donald Granberg and Edward Brent, “When Prohecy 
Bends: The Preference-Expectation Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1980”, 45 J. 
Person-ality & Soc. Psychol. (1983) 477, pp. 477-479, tbl.1; Robert A. Olsen, “Desirability 
Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evidence from Experts”, 10 J. 
Behav. Decision Making (1997) 65, pp. 66-70; Roy M. Poses and Michele Anthony, 
“Availability, Wishful Thinking, and Physicians Diagnostic Judgments for Patients with 
Suspected Bacteremia”, 11 Med. Decision Making (1991) 159; George Wright and Peter 
Ayton, “Subjective Confidence in Forecasts: A Response to Fischhoff and McGregor”, 5 J.
Forecasting (1986) 117 (all reporting biases in predictions and estimates, under a variety 
of names, in the direction of participants’ preferences, in both laboratory studies and 
observational data).
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candidate or party they favor in an election, the team they like better in a sports’ match, 
or the company in which they have invested.81 Such egocentric biases, in turn, may 
both explain the pervasive empirical evidence of excess entry into various industries, 
and suggest that this entry may be less effective in limiting the exercise of market 
power by incumbent firms than is commonly thought.82
B. Choice: The Construction of Preferences
Decision makers constantly make legally relevant choices, most often under uncertainty. 
Contracting parties, for instance, must choose among different terms concerning future 
events whose probability is uncertain. Similarly, a tort plaintiff must often choose 
between trial, whose outcomes are uncertain, and settlement. Occasionally, legally 
relevant choices are also made under risk – that is, when the probability distribution of 
the possible outcomes is known. Anyone who gambles on the outcome of an unbiased 
coin toss, for example, knows the probability of its landing heads (or tails) is 50%, but 
he still needs to decide where to put his money. Yet legal choices are sometimes made 
under certainty. For instance, a consumer seeking to buy a given type of product must 
still choose among the available alternatives, even when the attributes of the different 
products are all known to him. This consumer needs to evaluate and weigh up different 
product attributes – such as price, quality, functionality, and more – to determine which 
product’s attribute mix to choose.83
For the hypothetical rational actor choice is a straightforward matter, an act that 
merely reveals his preexisting, well ordered, preferences,84 serving to maximize 
81. E.g., Badad, id.; Badad and Katz, id.; Granberg and Brent, id.
82. See: Tor (supra note 16) pp. 503-514 (explaining excess entry), 548-552 (evaluating the 
impact of entry on market power).
83. For the distinction between uncertainty, risk, and certainty in a classical text see, for 
instance, R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (Reprint. 1989) 13 
(introducing these concepts in the context of choice as follows:
We shall say that we are in the realm of decision making under:
(a) Certainty if each action is know to lead invariably to a specific outcome ...
(b) Risk if each action leads to one of a set of possible specific outcomes, each
outcome occurring with a known probability ... 
(c) Uncertainty if either action or both has as it consequence a set of possible 
specific outcomes, but where the probabilities of these outcomes are
completely unknown or are not even meaningful.)
84. The notion that choices “reveal” people’s preferences originated with Paul A. Samuelson, 
“A Note on the Theory of Consumer’s Behavior”, 5 Economica 61; and Paul A. Samuelson, 
“A Note on the Theory of Consumer’s Behavior: An Addendum”, 5 Economica 353, 
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his subjective expected utility (SEU).85 However, much like in the case of belief 
formation, a wealth of psychological evidence reveals that real decision makers 
systematically and predictably deviate from the theoretical model of rational choice. 
Moreover, individuals frequently exhibit social preferences – that is, preferences about 
the outcomes of other people – that similarly lead to systematic deviations from the 
choices anticipated by models of self-interested rational action. The following sections 
therefore outline briefly some illustrative violations of rational choice with significant
legal implications.
1. Context Dependence
One basic requirement for rational action is context independence – namely, that the 
relative attractiveness of options within a given set should not vary with the addition 
or deletion of other options.86 A decision maker who prefers apples to oranges, 
for instance, should not change this relative preference when a third option, say a 
banana, is offered as well.87 Yet despite the intuitive appeal of context independence, 
researchers have revealed many circumstances that lead individuals to violate it.88 
and received much attention and development since. For one short and highly readable 
discussion of the concept and its appeal see: Amatya Sen, “Behaviour and the Concept of 
Preference”, 40 Economica (1973) 241, pp. 241-244. 
85. E.g., Blaug (supra note 27) pp. 229-230 (stating that “…some regard the most characteristic 
feature of neoclassical economics ... its insistence on methodological individualism: the 
attempt to derive all economic behavior from the action of individuals seeking to maximize 
their utility, subject to the constraints of technology and endowments. This is the so-called 
rationality postulate, which figures as a minor premise in every neoclassical argument…”
an explaining the concept further). The aximoatization of SEU was formalized by John 
Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1947) 
pp. 617-628 (an appendix to the book); and Leonard L. Savage, The Foundations of 
Statistics (1954) (developing the notion of personal – i.e. subjective – probability and 
tying it with expected utility). For a more detailed discussion of rational choice theory in 
law specifically see: Korobkin and Ulen (supra note 5) pp. 1060-1066.
86. Assuming these additional options convey no additional information regarding the original 
set of options, the rational choice condition known as “regularity” states they should not 
affect the relative preferences regarding the original sense. For a clear summary exposition 
of this and other rational choice axioms (as well as illustrations of their violation) see: 
Dawes (supra note 15) pp. 504-512.
87. Of course, context independence does not preclude the possibility that one may rationally 
prefer bananas to both apples and oranges.
88. See generally: Dawes (supra note 15) pp. 504-512.
258 259
“Compromise effects” – that is, the finding that an option appears more attractive
when presented as intermediate rather than extreme – are one illustrative source 
of context-independence violations.89 These effects are frequently exploited by 
marketers, who provide product varieties that are either very minimal or very 
elaborate – and thus rarely purchased – to encourage consumers to buy intermediate, 
“compromise,” versions of their products. Similarly, in legal settings, if courts find
compromise verdicts more attractive, advocates – such as prosecutors in criminal cases 
– could exploit this effect by presenting a given charge as a compromise rather than 
an extreme option.90
In fact, scholars have shown experimentally how compromise effects can impact 
legal decisions.91 In one such study, participants were provided with a short summary 
of a case in which a woman poisoned her husband. The relevant facts were conceded 
by the defense and the prosecution, and the only remaining decision concerned the 
crime of which the defendant should be convicted – manslaughter, murder, or special 
circumstances murder. Importantly, the choice between manslaughter and murder 
(of any sort) should have turned on the participants’ belief regarding the defendant’s 
mental state when committing the crime. If she were under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, she should have been convicted of manslaughter; otherwise, 
she should have been convicted of murder. In one group of participants, who were 
only given the choice between manslaughter and “standard” murder, 47% chose the 
former and 53% the latter. In a second group, however, which was also offered the 
verdict option of special circumstances murder (which may well have existed in this 
case), only 19% opted for manslaughter, with 81% choosing one of the two murder 
categories (39% and 42% choosing the murder and special circumstances murder, 
respectively).92 Hence, although the proportion of participants choosing manslaughter 
over murder should have been independent of the context – namely, the availability of a 
second murder category – the results revealed a dramatic compromise effect.93
89. Id., pp. 505-507. 
90. Sunstein (supra note 13) p. 2648 (discussing this and similar possibilities).
91. Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich and Amos Tversky, “Context-Dependence in Legal 
Decision Making”, 25 J. Leg. Stud. (1996) 287 (reporting 5 experiments showing 
compromise and contrast effects in legal decision settings).
92. Id., pp. 290-292.
93. Note, however, that in the scenario described in the text, the very presence of a special 
circumstances option may have communicated to participants information about the 
appropriateness of murder rather than manslaughter in this case – say, because the special 
circumstances enumerated focused participants’ attention on factors such as the means 
and motive for the killing that made manslaughter appear less likely. For this reason, the 
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2. Framing Effects, Reference Points, and Loss Aversion
Rational choices among different options under risk or uncertainty depend on the value 
and probability of these options, as well as on one’s risk attitude. A risk-neutral decision 
maker would simply choose the option with the highest expected value, preferring 
a 50% chance of getting $101, for instance, to getting $50 for sure. Rational decision 
makers, however, may also be risk averse or risk seeking, the former discounting the 
expected value of a risky prospect to account for the risk involved, while the latter 
finding such a prospect more attractive than its mere expected value.94 Regardless of
risk attitude, however, rational choice among risky (or uncertain) prospects should 
not depend on how these options are framed or described, a principle known as 
invariance.95 This condition resembles the requirement of context independence, 
described above, but concerns different descriptions of the same set of options rather 
than the addition of options to a set or choices between different sets.96 
As the following example illustrates, however, the description or “framing” of 
alternatives can exert a dramatic impact on choice among risky prospects in violation 
of the invariance requirement. In this experiment, which became known as the “Asian 
disease” problem, the first group of participants read:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences
of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 
people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people 
will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you choose?
researchers conducted another study that controlled for this explanation, id, pp. 292-95. 
See also their discussion of whether irrelevant alternatives conveyed information id., pp. 
301-03. 
94. See e.g., Neumann and Morgenstern (supra note 85) p. 629 (noting specifically their
axoimatization of EU does not require a specific risk attitude). See also: Hogarth (supra
note 31) pp. 89-90 (describing these different utility functions and their interpretation). 
95. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames”, 39 Am. Psycholog. 
(1984) 341.
96. Cf. Dawes (supra note 15) p. 512 (distinguishing choice inconsistencies arising from 
the presentation of alternatives – or framing – from other violation of rational choice 
conditions).
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When faced with this question, 72% of the participants chose Program A, with the 
remaining 28% choosing Program B. Note that the actuarial value of the two programs 
is identical, although they differ markedly in the distribution of outcomes they offer. 
The majority’s choice of Program A therefore represents a risk-averse preference, 
which appears to value the certain saving of 200 of lives over the risky alternative that 
may save more lives but is more likely to save none. 
A second group of participants were asked the same question, but with a different 
description – that is, a different framing – of the prospects associated with the two 
programs:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 
nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people 
will die.
Which of the two programs would you choose?
Thus, the problem given to this second group involved identical prospects but 
a different frame from that in the question presented to the first group. In striking
contrast to the choices made by the first group, however, 78% of the participants in this
group chose the risky Program D – whose prospects are identical to those of unfavored 
Program B. Only 22% opted for the certain prospects of Program C, which is identical 
to Program A favored by the first group.97
Kahneman and Tversky famously used this and other studies to illustrate some 
common characteristics of human decision making under risk and uncertainty, which 
they combined in their descriptive “Prospect Theory”:98 first, choice is reference-
dependent – that is, outcomes are evaluated as positive (“gains”) or negative (“losses”) 
changes from a reference point.99 Such choice patterns, of course, stand in sharp 
97. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice”, 211 Science (1981) 453, p. 453 [hereinafter “Framing of Decisions”].
98. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk”, 47 Econometrica (1979) 263 [hereinafter “Propect Theory”]. Note also 
that prospect theory is only the famous member of a large family of models that seek 
better descriptive fit by modifying some rational choice assumptions. See generally Chris
Stramer, “Developments in Nonexpected–Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive 
Theory of Choice under Risk”, Advances in Behavioral Economics (Colin F. Camerer, 
George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin – eds., 2004) 104 (reviewing the development of 
such theories, how they fare in experimental tests, and how they can be used).
99. Kahneman and Tversky, id., pp. 277- 280. Similarly, people prefer buying products 
either at “regular” prices or with a “discount” for, say, paying in cash, to buying identical 
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contrast to the rational-actor model, where choices are made based on their effect 
on the decision maker’s overall utility, or total asset position in the case of financial
decisions, but different descriptions of the same overall outcomes clearly should not 
matter. Prospect theory therefore describes choice as based on “value,” instead of 
utility.100 Second, sensitivity to positive and negative changes is strongest near the 
reference point and diminishes with the distance from it.101 The difference between 
a gain of $100 and a gain of $200 appears greater, for example, than the difference 
between a gain of $1100 and a gain of $1200. Consequently, the value function is 
concave in the “gains” domain and convex in the “loss” domain. Third, a loss of any 
given amount is psychologically more aversive than a gain of the same amount is 
attractive. Because of this “loss aversion” the theory’s value function is significantly
steeper for losses than for gains. 
The failure of invariance as a result of framing is both pervasive and robust,102 
and has clear importance for the law. One legal area in which the effects of framing 
have been investigated in a number of studies is litigation and settlement.103 In 
litigation, each party has to determine whether it prefers the sure compromise outcome 
of a settlement to the risky trial – with its potential for either a better or a worse 
products at identical prices, when those prices are described instead as a “regular” price 
for cash and a credit “surcharge.” In this case, the “regular” price may serve as a natural 
reference point, compared to which the “discount” is perceived as an attractive gain, and 
the “surcharge” as an unpleasant loss. Note, moreover, that such framing effects may also 
impact behavior. See, e.g., Nicholas Epley, Dennis Mak and Lorraine Chen Idson “Bonus 
or Rebate? The Impact of Income Framing on Spending and Saving”, 19 J. Behav. Dec. 
Making (2006) 213.
100. Kahneman and Tversky (supra note 98).
101. Id., p. 214. This a typical psychophysical function common to human (and animal) 
perception in many domains. 
102. See generally: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions”, 59 J. Buss. S. (1986) 251 (reviewing and explaining some of this evidence). 
103. See e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,” Gains, Loses, and the Psychology of Litigation”, 70 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. (1996) 113 (providing a detailed account and experimental and observational 
evidence regarding the potential role of framing litigation and settlement) [“Psychology 
of Litigation”]. See also: Chris Guthrie, “Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological 
Theory”, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. (2000) 163 (using some features of an advanced version of 
prospect theory to explain frivolous litigation behavior); Russell Korobkin and Chris 
Guthrie, “Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the 
Lawyer”, 76 Tex. L. Rev. (1997) 77 (using framing to explain evaluations of settlement 
options by lawyers and clients).
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outcome.104 Prospect theory suggests, however, a basic asymmetry between plaintiffs 
and defendants, with the former being more likely to view the trial v. settlement 
decision as a choice between two gains – one risky and one certain.105 If this were the 
case, we would expect plaintiffs to be risk-averse. Defendants, on the other hand, may 
well view their choice as between two losses and therefore exhibit risk-seeking.106
This potential frame-induced, systematic, discrepancy between plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ risk attitudes may contribute to the failure of some lawsuits to settle 
out of court even in circumstances where a settlement might be beneficial to both
parties.107 If shown to be sufficiently robust, moreover, such an effect would have
various ramifications for policy making in the litigation area, including directing more
settlement facilitation effort towards defendants, rather than plaintiffs, and providing 
some justification for more coercive measures of alternative dispute resolution in
courts.108
More generally, the choice framing can also provide a policy tool to facilitate 
desirable behaviors or diminish the attractiveness of undesirable ones. For instance, 
efforts to educate the public about preventive health measures – such as breast 
cancer examinations – have been more successful when emphasizing the negative 
consequences of not taking these measures than when focusing on their health 
benefits.109
104. See e.g., George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation”, 
13 J. Leg. Stud. (1984) 1 (an economic model that predicts when settlement occurs in 
the shadow of trial); Steven Shavell, “Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis 
under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs”, 11 J. Leg. Stud. (1982) 55 
(proposing an economic model of litigation, accounting for allocation of costs). 
105. Putting aside, for simplicity, the significant issue of attorney fees, which also differ across
legal systems.
106. E.g., Rachlinski (supra note 103) pp. 128-129. 
107. Id., pp. 119-120.
108. Of course, to justify such measures a fuller analyses of the parties’ judgments, choices, 
and incentives would be required. Note also that in reality risk attitudes may reverse or 
otherwise differ, depending on various factors concerning the parties and the case. See 
e.g., Guthrie (supra note 103) (arguing that in low probability suites risk attitudes may 
reverse); Rachlinski (supra note 103) pp. 129-130 (conceding that risk attitudes also 
depend on factors beyond basic role as plaintiff or defendant). 
109. Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) pp. 1536-1537 (also discussing the possible 
benefits of “government advertising” more generally).
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3. The Status Quo Bias and the Endowment Effect 
The status quo bias (SQB) and the endowment effect are among the behavioral 
phenomena of greatest significance for legal analysis.110 SQB refers to the general
finding that individuals tend to prefer their present state to alternative states, all else
being equal.111 Hence, even in the absence of transaction costs, people are more likely 
to remain in their status quo position rather than make a choice that would have put 
them in the same position if it were not the status quo. In one typical illustration, 
experimental participants that were given a number of investment options and an 
existing allocation of investments tended to make choices that retained the existing 
allocation.112 Similar findings appear in real-world settings, where employees who are
offered a variety of investment options for their pension savings – a decision of great 
personal importance – tend to allocate their contributions equally among the set of 
options their institution happens to provide.113 
The endowment effect, another common manifestation of SQB, means that decision 
makers tend to value more highly goods that they hold than those they do not hold.114 
110. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, “Behavioral Law and Economics”, Yale Law School Research 
Paper N. 130 (May 2007); Russell Korobkin, “The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis”, 
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. (2003) 1227, p. 1229 [“Endowment Effect”] (“The endowment effect 
is undoubtedly the most significant single finding from behavioral economics for legal
analysis to date”); Samuel Issacharoff, “Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?”, 
51 Vand. L. Rev. (1998) 1729, p.1735 (calling the endowment effect “the most significant
empirical observation from behavioral economics”). 
111. Korobkin, id., p. 1228-1229. 
112. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making”, 1 J. 
Risk and Uncertain. (1988) 7, pp. 12-19. 
113. Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler, “Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined
Contribution Saving Plans”, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. (2001) 79 (providing varied evidence 
for this 1/n naïve diversification rule, and discussing its underlying causes and economic
implications).
114. The term was introduced by Richard H. Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer 
Choice”, 1 J. Econ. Behav. and Org. (1980) 39. See also: Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. 
Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and 
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. (1990) 1325 [hereinafter: “Experimental Tests”]; 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”, 5 J. Econ. Persp. (1991) 193 (a variant with 
some extensions of the preceding article); Jack L. Knetsch, “The Endowment Effect and 
Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves”, Choices, Values, and Frames (Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky- eds., 2000) 171 [hereinafter “Choices, Values, and 
Frames”].
264 265
As a result, there is a systematic discrepancy between the lower price people are 
willing to pay (or “WTP”) for a good they do not possess and the higher price they 
ask (or “WTA”) for selling the same good when they do possess it.115 Like SQB more 
generally, the endowment effect has proved robust and prevalent, in the laboratory and 
the real world alike.116 In one common type of experiment, half the participants are 
endowed with an item – such as a lottery ticket, a university mug, or a fancy chocolate 
bar – and another half given a roughly equivalent amount of cash. Participants are then 
given the opportunity to trade the good for the money and vice versa. In the absence of 
an endowment effect, some participants will prefer the good and some the money, with 
the two groups exhibiting similar preferences. In the endowment condition, however, a 
significantly larger proportion of participants hold on to the good compared with their
cash-equivalent counterparts.117
In the real world, there is evidence, for example, that people’s choices of car 
insurance policies depend on the default adopted by their state. When a more extensive 
and thus a more expensive coverage is the default insurance, a far greater proportion 
of citizens adopt it; on the other hand, when a more limited and cheaper insurance 
policy is offered as the default, a far smaller percentage of citizens opt for the more 
extensive and expensive alternative.118 Comparable findings appear for evaluations of
environmental commodities, such as air quality, which strikingly depend on whether 
people are asked about the value of diminishing or increasing current quality, as well 
as in many other domains.119
115. This discrepancy is also known as the “offer-asking” or WTA/WTP gap. See, e.g., 
Eliazbeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, “Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to 
Accept: Legal and Economic Implications”, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. (1993) 59 (reviewing the 
evidence on the WTP/WTA gap and discussing its implications); Jack L. Knetsch and J. 
A. Sinden, “Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence 
of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value”, 99 Q. J. Econ. (1984) 507 (providing 
early evidence of the disparity); Jack L. Knetsch and J. A. Sinden, “The Persistence of 
Evaluation Disparities”, 102 Q. J. Econ. (1987) 691 (discussion of additional evidence, 
including a critical analysis of one study showing disparity elimination after multiple 
trials).
116. See the studies collected in Korobkin (supra note 110) pp. 1232-1235. 
117. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (supra note 114) pp. 1339-1341. 
118. Eric J. Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros and Howard Kunreuther, “Framing, 
Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions”, 7 J. Risk & Uncert. (1993) 35 reprinted 
in Choices, Values, and Frames (supra note 95) pp. 224, 238 (reporting such data from 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania). 
119. See the studies collected in Korobkin (supra note 110) p. 1232.
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120. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, Experimental Tests (supra note 114) p. 1326. This is 
especially true in circumstances such as those studied in the experiments, which involved 
immediate endowments, in the absence of wealth effects, without changes in preferences 
over time or other factors that may explain preference changes following endowment. For 
a somewhat extreme view on the stability and commonality of tastes see: George J. Stigler 
and Gary S. Becker, “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. (1977) 76, 
p. 76 (asserting that “tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly between 
people”).
121. Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, 3 J. L. and Econ. (1960) 1, p. 14. See 
also: Hoffman and Spitzer (supra note 115) p. 63.
122. See, e.g., Korobkin, Endowment Effect (supra note 110) p. 1257.
123. While a thorough analysis of this important question is outside the scope of the present 
discussion, the answer requires a better understanding of the psychological mechanisms 
The SQB and the endowment effect pose many challenges for legal analysis, 
especially for law and economics. These phenomena directly contradict the rational 
choice model that preferences are independent of the status quo.120 They therefore 
challenge the Coase theorem - a cornerstone thesis of the economic analysis of law 
– which holds that, in the absence of transaction costs, the initial assignment of 
legal entitlements does not change their ultimate ownership since parties who value 
entitlements more highly will trade with their current owners. In reality, of course, 
transactions are rarely without costs, and scholars have therefore advocated assigning 
entitlements to the highest valuing parties, to reduce these transaction costs. Where 
the highest valuing party is unknown, moreover, the Coase theorem implies that 
entitlements should be assigned to those best positioned to trade them, so as to increase 
the likelihood of these entitlements finding their way to the highest valuing party. 121
However, the offer-asking gap means that the initial allocation of an entitlement 
matters greatly since it may lead to inefficient outcomes. After all, the higher WTAs
exhibited by some entitlement holders (who would have assigned a lower WTP to the 
entitlement were they not holding it) may prevent a beneficial trade with other parties
with higher initial WTPs. Hence, a mistake in the initial assignment of legal rights 
may determine their ultimate, potentially inefficient, possession even in the absence of
transaction costs or wealth effects. 
It may also be difficult to determine in fact who the highest valuing party for a given
entitlement is. Different parties may endow their entitlements differently, such that one 
party could exhibit the highest WTP – the traditional measure of value in economics 
– while another would exhibit the highest WTA.122 The answer to this valuation 
dilemma would depend on whether the endowment effect reflects a “real” increase in
the value of the entitlement to its holder or merely a psychological artifact, a reluctance 
to part with possessions.123
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underlying the endowment effect, which are not fully understood. Most likely, these 
phenomena have multiple psychological bases. One major contributing factor is loss 
aversion, discussed above, which may case SQB when individuals use the status quo as 
a reference state for decision making. Thus, relinquishing a good one owns is typically 
coded as a “loss,” which is comparably more painful than the pleasure resulting from 
the “gain” involved in the acquisition of that same good by one who does not own it. 
Regret avoidance also likely contributes to this cluster of phenomena, since giving up 
an endowment may cause more regret. See, e.g., id., pp. 1242-1259 (reviewing potential 
causes for the endowment effect and discussing their implications for the debate on 
determining the correct valuation measure).
124. E.g., id., pp. 1266-1267.
125. Id., p. 1267.
126. The literature on contractual defaults is voluminous. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz and 
Robert E. Scott, “The Mitigation Principle: Towards a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation”, 69 Va. L. Rev. (1983) 967, p. 971 (defaults should be designed to provide 
what most bargainers would have preferred); Posner (supra note 5) p. 96 (stating that 
courts should try to mimic what the parties would have done had they dealt with the 
particular contingency that materialized). 
127. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, “The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules”, 83 
Cornell L. Rev. (1998) 608, p. 611 [hereinafter “Status Quo Bias”] (“…contracts scholars 
Another general illustration of the significance of SQB for legal scholarship is in
the area of legislation and regulation. All else being equal, because of the SQB the 
public is likely to prefer the legislative and regulatory status quo to an alternative set 
of rules. Moreover, because of SQB, beneficiaries of the status quo will struggle harder
to maintain it than they originally would have fought to establish it. The opposite 
would hold for those preferring an alternative regime, however, making changes of the 
legal status quo even less likely and more difficult.124 This effect also implies that the
government would often find it easier to impose new laws or regulatory standards to
obtain its goals – such as in the areas of environmental regulation or taxation – than to 
change already existing ones.125
Finally, SQB and the endowment effect teach important lessons for various 
substantive law areas. In contract law, for instance, these phenomena highlight the 
power of default rules to shape ultimate contractual outcomes. Traditionally, default 
rules – that is, rules of contract law that control the transaction only if the parties have 
not opted out of them by agreement – are deemed of limited significance. They are
counted valuable when well designed to address the common needs of contracting 
parties, providing “off-the-rack” cost-saving alternatives to expensive negotiated 
terms.126 When defaults do not match their needs, parties are assumed to negotiate 
a solution that reflects their preferences.127 Yet the general evidence on SQB, as well
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... uniformly bases their analyses upon a dubious assumption ... that the contracting 
parties’ preferences ... remain the same regardless of the choice of default rules.”) 
128. See: Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, id. (reviewing the relevant literature and conducting 
additional experimental tests). For one recent study purporting to show defaults exert little 
impact on the choice of contractual remedies see: Randolph Sloof, Hessel Oosterbeek and 
Joep Sonnemans, “On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies”, 163 J. Inst. & Theo. 
Econ. (2007) 5. But see Avishalom Tor, “On Contractual Defaults and Experimental Law 
and Economics”, 163 J. Inst. & Theo. Econ. (2007) 26 [hereinafter “Experimental Law 
and Economics”] (showing Sloof et al.’s results have limited relevance for the analysis of 
contractual defaults).
129. E.g., Korobkin, Status Quo Bias (supra note 127) pp. 664-666. 
130. The experimental economics ultimatum game literature is enormous. A superb, readable 
but high quality summary is available in Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: 
Experiments on Strategic Interaction (2003) pp. 48-56. 
131. Id., pp. 62-63.
as a few studies that specifically examined the case of contractual defaults, suggests
that defaults may impact the result of contract negotiations.128 Parties who view 
default rules as the status quo would be more reluctant to adopt an alternative term 
and demand more in return for such a change when it is not to their benefit. Of course,
when the benefits of opting out are sufficiently great, SQB is unlikely to prevent the
adoption of an alternative term, but an inefficient default may well be retained if the
effects of the bias outweigh the benefits of opting out.129
4. Social Preferences
Beyond documenting the construction of preference by context, frame, and more, 
behavioral research also shows how individuals exhibit preferences that are not purely 
self-interested. They care about the behavior and outcomes of others, and evaluate their 
own outcomes with respect to those obtained by others. There is much evidence, for 
example, that people care about both giving and receiving fair treatment, not only in 
personal contexts but in market settings as well. They will sometimes sacrifice payoffs
to behave fairly, expect others to do the same, and even engage in costly retaliation 
against behavior they think unfair.
One illustrative and extensively studied case of such fairness-oriented behavior 
is the ultimatum game.130 One player (“Proposer”) is asked to allocate a given sum 
of money to himself and another player (“Responder”). The latter then must choose 
whether to accept the offered allocation. If Responder accepts, each party gets a share 
according to the offer; if Responder rejects the offer, both parties get nothing. The 
basic game is anonymous and without repetition, so considerations of reputation and 
future retaliation should be irrelevant.131 
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132. Id. and Table 2.2 therein.
133. Id., pp. 60-62.
134. Note that the independent role of fairness-related concerns – as opposed to strategic 
considerations – in this allocation setting is further highlighted by ultimatum game 
variants that show Responders to reject comparatively inferior allocations even where 
their rejections have no impact on Proposers’ payoff (e.g., Gary Bolton and Rami Zwick, 
“Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining”, 10 Games & Econ. Behav. 
95 (1995); Duncan K H Fong and Gary E Bolton, “Analyzing Ultimatum Bargaining: A 
Bayesian Approach to the Comparison of Two Potency Curves under Shape Constraint”, 
15 J. Bus. & Econ. Stat. (1997) 335). Accordingly, other studies directly reveal the role 
played by Responders’ negative emotional reactions to comparatively unfair allocations 
(e.g., Armin Falk, Ernest Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, “On the Nature of Fair Behavior”, 41 
Econ. Inquiry (2003) 20; Madan M. Pillutla and J. Keith Murnighan, “Unfairness, Anger, 
and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers”, 68 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 
(1996) 208).
135. See: Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) pp. 1510-1516 (discussing bans on 
market transactions). Note that such bans are less important in market settings where 
customers can discipline repeat-play sellers who thus have a reputation to protect (see, 
e.g., the results of Daniel Kahneman Kack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler, “Fairness as a 
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market”, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. (1986) 728
on the willingness of customers to penalize sellers who exploit temporary demand shocks 
A rational Responder should accept any positive sum, since the alternative to 
acceptance is rejection without any payment. In reality, however, Responders tend to 
reject offers that are below 20-30% of the sum that stands for allocation, and Proposers 
usually offer an even greater proportion – 40-50% of the sum.132 These findings hold,
moreover, even when the game is conducted with very significant sums of money.133
Responders’ readiness to reject offers of positive, sometimes significant, sums of
money reveals that they not only care about the fairness of the allocation, but are also 
willing to forgo financial gain to punish the unfair behavior of an anonymous party
they will never encounter again.134
The ultimatum game and similar findings clearly illustrate the importance people
assign to considerations of fairness, even at the expense of some financial benefit,
and thus has clear implications for legal analysis. The common concern for fairness, 
for example, may explain a number of legal rules that would not have made sense 
in a world of strictly rational actors. Some jurisdictions ban market transactions 
that appear economically beneficial, such as “usurious” lending – that is, very high
interest loans. Such bans may be a response to a public demand for the imposition of 
minimal standards of fairness on parties who might otherwise exploit a position of 
power in the market.135 Another case in point is the common prohibition against price 
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and the anecdotal evidence on seller behavior that accords with customers’ views). Such 
bans are more likely to appear, however, where sellers can enter, exploit temporary shocks, 
and exit; where payoffs to exploitation are relatively high; or where there is anonymity or 
otherwise no repeat play or reputation costs. Of course, factors other the fairness – such 
as the bounded rationality of certain borrowers – may also drive bans on usurious lending, 
either on paternalistic grounds or because of the negative externalities of high-interest 
loans.
136. This is especially true for “secondary line” price discrimination, where the concern is 
that the business that buys at a higher price will be at a competitive disadvantage. See 
generally: Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics 
(2007) pp. 689-713 (discussing such price discrimination under US and EC law, and 
providing references to other jurisdictions as well). 
137. This may very well be the case with the historical enactment of competition laws more 
generally, which where significantly fueled by populist concerns about fair competition
and the consequences of concentrations of market power. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Louis 
Kaplow and Aaron S. Edlin, I Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their 
Application (rev. ed. 2006) 103 (discussing the intent of the US Sherman Act’s framers). 
138. See: Max H. Bazerman, George F. Loewenstein and Sally Blount White, “Reversals 
of Preference in Allocation Decisions: Judging an Alternative versus Choosing among 
Alternatives”, 37 Admin. Sci. Q. (1992) 220; Stephen M. Garcia and Avishalom Tor, 
“Rankings, Standards, and Competition: Task vs. Scale Comparisons”, 102 Org. Behav. 
& Hum. Dec. Proc. (2007) 95; Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor, Max H. Bazerman and 
Dale T. Miller, “Profit Maximization versus Disadvantageous Inequality: The Impact of
Self-Categorization”, 18 J. Behav. Dec. Mak. (2005) 187; Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom 
Tor and Richard Gonzalez, “Ranks and Rivals: a Theory of Competition”, 32 Person. 
& Soc. Psych. Bull. (2006) 970; George F. Loewenstein, Leigh Thompson and Max H. 
Bazerman, “Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts”, 57 J. Person. 
& Soc. Psych. (1989) 426. 
139. See: Avishalom Tor, Oren Gazal-Ayal and Stephen M. Garcia, “Innocence, Fairness 
discrimination in competition laws,136 which is frequently criticized as inefficient but
may well reflect fairness concerns.137
In addition to helping explain the content of law, an understanding of decision 
makers’ fairness concern can also help in shaping legal rules. Experimental studies 
by this Author, colleagues, and others found, for example, that people are concerned 
with how they are treated compared to others even in situations that do not require 
the division of fixed sums, and may even forgo financial benefits because of such
comparison concerns.138 The aversion to disadvantageous comparisons was similarly 
manifested in a recent study of the willingness to accept plea bargain offers, which 
prosecutors extensively rely on to resolve criminal cases.139 Defendants who accept 
270 271
and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers” (July 2007, manuscript on file with
Author) [hereinafter, “Plea Offers”] (Studies 4-5). 
140. Oren Bar-Gill and Oren Gazal-Ayal, “Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty”, 49 J. Law 
& Econ. (2006) 353; Frank H. Easterbrook, “Criminal Procedure as a Market System”, 
12 J. Leg. Stud. 289, pp. 309–317 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, “Plea Bargaining as 
Compromise”, 101 Yale L. J. (1992) 1969, p. 1975; William M. Landes, “An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts”, 14 J. Law & Econ. (1971) 61; Robert E. Scott and William J. 
Stuntz, “Plea Bargaining as Contract”, 101 Yale L. J. (1992) 1909. Cf. also supra notes 
105, 106 and the accompanying text (discussing the shadow of trial model in the civil 
litigation setting).
141. E.g., Scott and Stuntz, id., p. 1926. 
142. Tor, Gazal-Ayal and Garcia, Plea Offers (supra note 139) p. 20.
143. Albert W. Alschuler, “The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate”, 69 Cal. L. Rev. (1981) 
652; William J. Stuntz, “Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow”, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. (2004) 2548, pp. 2552, 2567.
144. Tor, Gazal-Ayal and Garcia, Plea Offers (supra note 139) p. 27. Of course, this conclusion 
is illustrative rather than conclusive, since an increase in the transparency of plea bargain 
outcome may generate some difficulties as well. For one, transparency may exacerbate
the effects of egocentric biases, which are likely to impact comparative evaluations. In 
fact, some of the evidence from bargaining in civil disputes specifically records egocentric
a plea offer choose a certain conviction and a discounted sanction over the risky 
prospect of a trial, where they may be either acquitted or convicted and sanctioned 
more heavily.140 A rational defendant would therefore find a comparison with the offers
made to others absolutely irrelevant (other than for informational purposes), basing 
the plea decision solely on his risk attitudes regarding conviction and sanction.141 Real 
defendants, however, may be affected by comparison concerns and therefore determine 
the attractiveness of a plea offer also based on whether it appears superior or inferior to 
comparable offers given to other, similarly situated, defendants.142 
Interestingly, defendants’ comparison concerns may help address some of the 
criticisms commonly leveled against plea bargaining practices. Scholars argue, 
for example, that plea bargains lead to excessive diversity in sentencing, because 
prosecutors have much room to manipulate offers. This prosecutorial leeway, in turn, 
results in the unequal treatment of similar cases.143 However, if defendants are averse 
to comparatively unfair offers, an increase in the transparency of plea bargaining may 
curtail the diversity problem. For instance, if plea bargains were published, or if defense 
lawyers were to inform their clients about the common practices of prosecutors in 
similar cases, defendants would tend to reject comparatively harsh offers. As a result, 
prosecutors, who are interested in maintaining high guilty plea rates, would reduce 
disparity, arbitrariness and inequality in plea bargaining.144
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judgments in comparative evaluations (e.g. Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and 
Camerer (supra note 79)). If this were the case, defendants with egocentrically biased 
judgments who obtained comparison information thanks to transparency would tend 
to believe their offers are harsher than they truly are and reject offers that unbiased 
defendants would have accepted. A legal system wishing to avoid the choice between 
frequent biased rejections and a “race to the bottom” among prosecutors with increasingly 
discounted offers may therefore prefer to maintain the opacity of plea bargain outcomes 
notwithstanding its costs.
145. See supra note 15 and the accompanying text.
All in all, therefore, research on the psychology of human judgment and decision 
making provides ample evidence for the systematic differences between rational-actor 
models and real human behavior. It also reveals human behavior to be highly adaptive, 
despite our inherent cognitive limitations, and reasonably predictable insofar as people 
commonly use certain judgmental heuristics and situational cues in their decision 
making. An acknowledgement of these behavioral patterns is important for legal 
analysis, since they can help the law make better predictions, and thus more effective 
prescriptions, when regulating behavior in society.
III. Empirical Foundations
The second theme this Article develops concerns the empirical foundations of 
the behavioral approach. The present section draws on these foundations for two 
purposes: first, to delineate the behavioral analysis of law, clarifying which forms of
legal scholarship lie within and without its boundaries. This demarcation, in turn, will 
allow for more coherent statements regarding the nature, potential, and limitations of 
the behavioral approach hereinafter. Second, to identify two distinct genres within the 
behavioral analysis of law – one theoretical and one experimental – that differently 
draw on its empirical foundations. The section will then show how each of these two 
genres possesses different strengths and weaknesses, how they may be used separately 
or in combination, and how they substitute for and complement one another.
A. Boundaries 
The empirical foundations of the behavioral analysis of law delineate its scope. 
In the main, the behavioral approach draws on findings from behavioral decision
research, an interdisciplinary field that examines judgment and decision making and
its psychology.145 Due to its interdisciplinary nature, this field draws researchers from
a range of disciplines – psychology, economics, business, accounting, medicine, and 
more – who share an interest in studying human decision making, paying special 
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146. See, e.g., Dawes, Handbook (supra note 15) pp. 529-530. 
147. The examples are too numerous to review. A few illustrative examples include Jon Hanson 
and David Yosifon, “The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical 
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture”, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2003) 129 (using a 
broad range of social psychological findings to make a radical claim regarding the impact
of the situation on behavior); Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, “The Law of Implicit 
Bias”, 94 Calif. L. Rev. (2006) 969 (applying evidence from implicit bias tests); David 
Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, “What Happened on Deliberation Day?”, 95 
Calif. L. Rev. (2007) 915 (applying findings – and conducting their own experiment – on
the impact of psychological group processes on the outcomes of group deliberation). 
148. E.g., Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) pp. 1489-1496 (applying ultimatum game 
findings); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, “The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability
Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies”, 80 Tex. L. Rev. (2001) 
219 (applying ultimatum and dictator game results); Robert E. Scott, “A Theory of Self-
Enforcing Indefinite Agreements”, 103 Colum. L. Rev. (2003) 1641 (applying experimental
economics findings on preferences for reciprocal behavior).
149. Cf. Langevoort, behavioral Theories (supra note 1) p. 1503 (identifying the potentially 
relevant sources of behavioral evidence as most psychological research, but choosing 
to limit the definition to "the "new" cognitive psychology literature on decision making
biases” for practical reasons) (emphasis in the original).
150. Cf. the similar approach taken with regard to behavioral economics by some of its leading 
scholars in Colin F. Camerer and George Loewenstein, “Behavioral Economics: Past, 
Present, and Future”, Advances in Behavioral Economics (supra note 98) p. 3, 7-9 (noting 
that “behavioral economists are methodological eclectists. They define themselves not
on the basis of the research methods that they employ but rather on [the basis of] their 
application of psychological insights to economics.”)
attention to discrepancies between normative models and actual human behavior.146 
Beyond drawing on behavioral decision research, however, behavioral analysts 
sometimes apply to the law other bodies of empirical evidence on human behavior, 
including additional social and cognitive psychological findings,147 data collected by
experimental economists,148 and more.149
Ultimately, therefore, the behavioral analysis of law is best characterized by its 
commitment to a combination of (a) empirical behavioral findings and (b) a legal
subject matter.150 In other words, legal scholarship not drawing on empirical 
behavioral findings is not engaged in a behavioral analysis of law. This is the case for
both scholarship that is interested in actual behavior but lacks an empirical foundation 
and legal analyses that are based on theory alone.
The first of these excluded categories is quite common. Traditional legal doctrine
and scholarship are often concerned with human behavior and frequently assume that 
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151. Supra note 2.
152. Even more compelling, in fact, than dry statistical evidence, due the effects of the 
availability heuristic. See supra notes 39-45 and the accompanying text. 
153. E.g., Davida A. Williams, “Punishing the Faithful: Freud, Religion, and the Law”, 24 
Cardozo L. Rev. (2003) 2181.
154. See supra notes 5-9 and the accompanying text.
155. While this characterization fits traditional law and economics, the new behavioral law and
economics seeks to incorporate empirical behavioral foundations into law and economics, 
as described infra Part V and is therefore, of course, well within the present definition of
the behavioral analysis of law.
156. Cf. the characterization of different “species” of empirical legal scholarship described by 
Shari Seidman Diamond, “Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and 
Plankton”, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. (2002) 803. 
specific legal rules or institutions will have some behavioral consequence.151 To take a
mundane example, those who respond to crime rate increases by calling for increased 
criminal sanctions to deter potential criminals assume a causal relationship between the 
magnitude of sanctions and deterrence. This assumption may be correct or mistaken, 
but insofar as the advocated legal change is based on intuition rather than empirical 
evidence, it is not a behavioral argument as the term is used here. Similarly, non-
systematic observations, although illustrative and often compelling,152 cannot alone 
form the basis for a behavioral analysis of legal questions. For example, a Freudian 
psychoanalytic interpretation of constitutional law texts153 may prove insightful, but 
is outside the ambit of the behavioral approach in that the theory it applies lacks a 
systematic empirical basis.
The second, prevalent, category of scholarship that is outside the behavioral 
analysis of law consists of arguments based on normative theories of human behavior. 
A familiar example is the traditional economic analysis of law, which considers 
human behavior of paramount importance, but simply assumes it is synonymous 
with theoretical rational action.154 The normative rational actor model describes the 
behavior of idealized agents rather than actual human decision makers,155 and thus 
does not fit the proposed definition of the behavioral analysis of law.
B. Two Genres
A review of extant scholarship in the behavioral approach as defined here reveals two
distinct, albeit closely related, methodological genres. The more common involves 
theoretical applications of behavioral evidence generated by non-legal, empirical, 
scholarship. Its rarer but important counterpart genre conducts direct empirical, mostly 
experimental, tests of legally relevant questions.156
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157. See the sources cited supra note 14.
158. In the sense of being solely self-interested. See the text accompanying notes 137-139 
supra. 
159. See Korobkin (supra note 110). For another example of scholars applying a focused 
behavioral phenomenon to a range of legal issues see: Ehud Guttel and Alon Harel, 
“Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics of Repeated Behavior”, 72 
U. Chi. L. Rev. (2005) 1197.
160. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract”, 47 Stan. 
L. Rev. (1995) 211, pp. 225-236 (in an article applying various behavioral phenomena to 
a number of contract law doctrines as well as to different types of contracts). For a further 
analysis of liquidated damages from a behavioral perspective see the text accompanying 
notes 173-181 infra.
161. While the analogy to law and economics is straightforward, other law-and scholarship 
typically uses a similar approach as well, importing concepts or methodological tools from 
1. Theoretical Applications
The typical methodology of legal scholarship within the behavioral approach is the 
theoretical application of behavioral findings to the law. This methodology possesses
some clear advantages and has been used to great effect in many legal domains,157 but 
also suffers significant limitations that behaviorally oriented scholars should consider.
A legal analyst may approach a theoretical application in a number of different ways. 
At times the researcher may learn of an important behavioral regularity which has clear 
relevance to the law, then use this behavioral insight to inform the analysis of a specific
doctrine or rule, a broader area of the law, or even multiple legal applications.
We have seen, for instance, that scholars may be able to account for a broad range 
of rules and doctrines – such as bans on otherwise efficient market transactions and
practices – that would appear inexplicable if legal actors were strictly rational,158 based 
on the large body of evidence that decision makers take considerations of fairness into 
account even in market settings. One can also find similarly broad legal applications of
more specific, focused, behavioral phenomena, such as the endowment effect.159
Alternatively, a scholar grappling with a concrete legal problem may draw 
simultaneously on a variety of behavioral findings. Contract law scholars, for example,
may consider multiple behavioral phenomena when examining the enforcement of 
liquidated damages clauses. Eisenberg, for one, has argued that overoptimism and 
the availability bias, as well as additional phenomena, may lead contracting parties to 
include deficient liquidated damages clauses in their agreements.160
Whether the target of application is broad or focused, however, the structure of 
theoretical behavioral analyses will appear familiar to the modern legal scholar, 
resembling theoretical applications of other extra-legal bodies of knowledge from 
or the methodologies of other sidciplines, such as philosophy or economics.161 This 
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another discipline. See, e.g., Marc Galanter and Mark Alan Edwards, “The Path of the 
Law Ands”, Wis. L. Rev. (1997) 375, pp. 375-76 (discussing the various interdisciplinary 
approaches to law and asserting that “[i]n spite of sharp differences among these schools, 
all concur that the legal world is not to be understood on its own terms, but requires the 
application of some method or substance provided by other disciplines.”).
162. Cf. the somewhat extreme attack on such applications by Mitchell (supra note 13) p. 
1911 (attaching “the facile way in which these scholars summarize and the incorporate 
psychological research findings into legal theory ignores important limitations on this
research”) and the response offered by Prentice, supra note 1 (showing at length that while 
Mitchell’s claims have some merit, they are largely overstated and do not undermine the 
main insights of the behavioral approach).
163. Cf. Rachlinski (supra note 13) p. 743 (arguing that the focus of behavioral decision theory 
on context and the limitations of empirical evidence gives it an advantage compared 
to legal approaches that are based purely on a normative standard, such as freedom 
of contract or efficiency). See aksi Chris Swoyer, “Judgment and Decision Making:
Extrapolations and Applications”, Judgment, Decisions, and Public Policy (supra note 
16) pp. 9, 18-21 (discussing the boundary conditions of some robust decision making 
phenomena and noting their importance for policy analysis since “[m]ost phenomena in 
psychology ... obtain only within a certain range of circumstances ...”).
164. See the several studies cited in Taylor and Brown (supra note 76). Notice, moreover, that 
although Taylor and Brown’s popular view on the connection between overoptimism 
and mental health also garnered some criticism, e.g., C. Randall Colvin and Jack Black, 
“Do Positive Illusions Foster Mental Health? An Examination of the Taylor and Brown 
Formulation”, 116 Psychol. Bull. 3 (1994), there is agreement that the clinically depressed 
are not generally overoptimistic.
165. See supra notes 75-77 and the accompanying text. For an in-depth analysis of two variables 
that moderate overoptimism – ambiguity and preference intensity – see: Tor (supra note 
16) pp. 520-531. 
superficial familiarity may have contributed in fact to the popularity of theoretical
behavioral applications in recent years, when many scholars whose main expertise lies 
elsewhere within the law have developed behaviorally informed theses.162
However, the seeming familiarity of the theoretical behavioral application may 
sometimes obscure the limitations and challenges inherent in this genre of analysis. 
Most notably, decision research provides a rich array of concrete, empirical findings
about human behavior, not abstract, uniform, theoretical constructs. Therefore, because 
behavioral findings are fundamentally empirical, their proper application should take
into account the specific conditions under which they occur.163 For instance, although
overoptimism is pervasive it is neither manifested by the clinically depressed164 nor 
by normal men with respect to their height.165 Moreover, any theoretical application 
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166. See, e.g., Robert Rosenthal and Ralph Rosnow, Essentials of Behavioral Research: 
Methods and Data Analysis (2d ed. 1991) p. 64 (explaining that external validity refers to 
generalizability); See also the discussion of the specific external validity concerns involved
in the use of experimental methods infra notes 181-183 and the accompanying text.
167. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff, “Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?”, 51 
Vand. L. Rev. (1998) 1729, p. 1734 (arguing that applied behavioral phenomena must 
be generalizable, robust, large, and capable of being translated into the actions of legal 
actors); Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) p. 1481 (suggesting that only robust 
findings should be incorporated into legal analysis).
168. This is true, of course, of empirical findings in other sciences as well, but is especially
pronounced in the case of human behavior, which is highly variable and adaptive. 
See also Gregory Mitchell, “Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in 
Behavioral Law and Economics”, 56 Vand. L. Rev. (2003) 1781, p. 1800 (lamenting the 
undiscriminating use of behavioral evidence by some legal scholars without attention to 
boundary conditions, contextual variables, and more). The importance of taking boundary 
conditions into account in behavioral applications is discussed in detail infra Part IV.A.
169. Becker (supra note 43) p. 5.
170. At least in the short term. See: Stigler and Becker (supra note 120).
of empirical findings, behavioral or otherwise, must overcome the external validity
challenge – namely, the question of the degree to which the findings generated in one
setting or domain still hold in the context of their proposed application.166
Those behavioral phenomena most valuable for the legal analyst therefore are well-
established, having proven robust over a wide range of circumstances.167 Yet their 
empirical character dictates that even such phenomena will never exhibit universal 
uniformity and constancy; they will always be subject to boundary conditions, those 
circumstances under which they will diminish or disappear.168 For this reason theoretical 
applications of behavioral evidence are fundamentally different from applications of 
theoretical, potentially universal, constructs developed by other disciplines.
The economic rational actor, for example, always exhibits perfect rationality in 
the pursuit of his utility maximizing goals.169 At times, his pursuit will be impeded 
by the attendant circumstances, such as when information is limited, but the rational 
actor’s preferences remain stable,170 his determination unwavering, and his behavior, 
therefore, predictable once his circumstances are known. The real human actor, alas 
(though some may say fortunately), is not so constant and predictable. His behavior 
does exhibit important regularities and common characteristics, which decision making 
scholars carefully study. Yet these are necessarily only tendencies, with boundary 
conditions; they may be manifested by most people under many circumstances, but 
never exhibited by all people all the time.
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171. Eisenberg (supra note 160).
172. Id., p. 230; Rachlinski (supra note 13) pp. 747-748. 
173. For a more detailed and nuanced review of some relevant findings in this area, as well as
an illustration of their significance to legal analysis, see: Tor (supra note 16) pp. 520-531
(using evidence on two variables that moderate overoptimism and related phenomena to 
help explain systematic differences in performance between startups and diversifying 
entrants). 
174. See, .e.g., Tor (supra note 16) pp. 512-514 (reviewing findings on the illusion of control).
175. One may construct an alternative explanation for the stronger impact of overoptimism on 
liquidated damages clauses as compared to performance terms. According to this account, 
The liquidated damages example, introduced above, may illustrate this point. 
The argument that the overoptimism of contracting parties sometimes will make 
liquidated damages clauses deficient has some appeal.171 Overoptimistic parties will
underestimate the likelihood of their breaching the contract in the future, and may 
therefore accept liquidated damages terms that a strictly rational actor would not 
have accepted. If this were the case, the tendency of the law to intervene in liquidated 
damages clauses more than in most other contractual terms could be understood as an 
adaptive response to the bounded rationality of contracting parties.172 
But if overoptimism were truly universal and constant, one would have to explain 
why it plagues liquidated damages more than other contractual clauses. Otherwise, 
overoptimism would either be a common, unavoidable feature of all contractual 
clauses or deal a severe blow to the principle of holding people to their consensual 
bargains, putting into question one of the fundamental justifications of freedom of
contract. The same reasoning would suggest, if overoptimism were uniform and 
constant, that all liquidated damages clauses should be equally suspect, regardless 
of the contracting parties’ nature, their other mutual obligations or any additional 
contractual circumstances.
Not surprisingly, however, a closer look at the empirical evidence reveals that 
overoptimism, although pervasive, is by no means a universal constant.173 For instance, 
overoptimism is pronounced when decision makers judge the likelihood of future 
negative events concerning outcomes of personal importance, especially outcomes that 
may partly depend on one’s behavior.174 These characteristics of overoptimism may in 
turn help explain why liquidated damages differ from most other contractual clauses: 
they concern the consequences of negative events, often far in the future; and they are 
relevant only in case of breach, which typically is a low probability event that may well 
depend on the parties’ behavior. These characteristics of liquidated damages clauses 
are generally absent from basic performance terms – such as those concerning price, 
quantity, and the like – that may therefore be less susceptible to the biasing effect of 
overoptimism.175 In addition, a fuller behavioral analysis of liquidated damages would 
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in the case of performance terms, the overoptimism of one party may be offset by that of his 
counterpart. An overoptimistic seller, for example, may accept a price that is too low, say 
because he underestimate the costs of production. At the time, however, an overoptimistic 
buyer also may be willing to accept a price that is too high, with ultimate contract price 
reflecting a more balanced outcome. This mutual offsetting effect of overoptimism is
unlikely to occur in the LD case, however. In that context, mutual overoptimism may lead 
both parties to underestimate their own likelihood of breach and its severity, even while 
they may still be concerned about the other party’s performance, with the result of both 
agreeing to paying accept excessive LDs. Nevertheless, this account does not explain, for 
instance, the differential susceptibility of different types of parties to including biased LD 
clauses, discussed below. 
176. Cf. Eisenberg (supra note 160) p. 225 (arguing that “these limits of cognition bear with 
special force on certain classes of contract provisions ... and certain kinds of contracts...).
177. Robert A. Hillman, “Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of 
Liquidated Damages”, 85 Cornell L. Rev. (2000) 717, p. 732. 
178. See, e.g., Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky, “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative 
Ignorance”, 110 Q. J. Econ. (1995) 585 (ambiguity aversion disappears or diminishes 
in the absence of comparative ignorance); Craig R. Fox and Martin Weber, “Ambiguity 
Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and Decision Context”, 88 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. 
Proc. (2002) 476 (extending the above results). But see: Clare Chua Choiw and Rakesh 
K. Sarin, “Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox”, 22 J. Risk & Uncertainty 
(2001) 129 (showing that ambiguity aversion sometimes remains even in non-comparative 
settings, although it is significantly stronger in the comparative setting).
seek to distinguish contracting situations where overoptimism will likely be more 
pronounced, because the factors facilitating it are present, from circumstances where 
these factors are absent and overoptimism should thus be of lesser legal concern.176
As in the case of overoptimism, recognition of the empirical contours of other 
behavioral phenomena is important for their effective legal application. For 
instance, Hillman relies on behavioral evidence to argue against intervention in 
liquidated damages clauses, inter alia based on findings on ambiguity aversion.
According to this argument, individuals prefer risky situations (i.e. with known 
outcome probability distributions) to ambiguous (or uncertain) ones, and therefore 
use liquidated damages clauses to reduce the ambiguity associated with the future 
outcomes of a potential breach of contract.177 However, closer examination of 
the empirical evidence reveals that ambiguity aversion is comparative, rather 
than absolute, and real-world decision makers therefore routinely operate under 
ambiguity. Ambiguity aversion does lead decision makers to prefer well defined
risks to ambiguous ones when given both alternatives,178 but is unlikely to be 
280 281
179. See: Rachlinski (supra note 13) p. 762. This is not to say, however, that other reasons, 
behavioral and beyond, may not caution against intervention liquidated damages clauses. 
180. William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-
Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference (2002) p. 38. 
181. Cf., e.g., the various sources arguing that judges are less (or not) susceptible to various 
errors and biases that impact juries in Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Chris 
Guthrie, “Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding”, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2005) 1251, pp. 1255-1256 and n. 21-25. But see, e.g 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich, “Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 
Cornell L. Rev. (2001) 777, 782-783 (summarizing evidence on decision errors made by 
experienced professionals such as lawyers, judges, real estate brokers, securities analysts 
and brokers and more).
182. E.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, id., pp. 790-794 (reporting a series of experimental 
studies using federal judges as participants and testing for a variety of established 
behavioral phenomena, including anchoring, in a legal setting of relevance for the 
judges).
a significant driver of liquidated damages clauses, which simply determine the
magnitude of damages in case of breach.179
In addition to necessitating close attention to the contours of specific behavioral
phenomena, their concrete, empirical, nature also requires the analyst to consider 
the external validity problem. This problem concerns the “validity of inferences 
about whether the ... effect ... holds over variations in persons, settings, treatment 
variables, and measurement variables.”180 External validity issues arise because 
theoretical legal applications use evidence generated in non-legal settings, which may 
differ in important rs from legal ones. It may be, for example, that well-established 
experimental findings based on numerous studies of laypeople might not apply to legal
professionals, such as judges.181 One could thus argue that lawyers or judges will not 
exhibit, say, anchoring effects when making legal judgments, because they possess 
unique experience and expertise.182
In principle, the external validity of theoretical applications is an empirical question, 
which could be resolved by a direct empirical test of a given behavioral phenomenon 
in the legal setting of interest. In this case, the researcher would conduct specific tests
of lawyers or judges in legal settings, to examine whether the anchoring findings from
non-legal settings still hold. As the following section explains, however, such direct 
testing is often not a practical alternative or complement to theoretical applications. 
In these common cases the analyst must consider whether any characteristics of the 
legal context of the application suggest an external validity problem. Fortunately, there 
is evidence for the presence of many behavioral phenomena in real-world settings, 
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183. There is an extensive literature examining experts’ decision processes, some of which is 
summarized by Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich. id.
184. In this sense, the series of studies by Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich, reported supra 
note 183 are quite unusual and informative. For some additional studies using judges 
participants see the studies collected by Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich id., n. 21.
185. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, “Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?”, 41 San Diego 
L. Rev. (2004) 1741 (citing an increase in law school programs that train in empirical 
methods); Robert C. Ellickson, “Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study”, 29 
J. Leg. Stud. (2000) 517, pp. 528-530 (analyzing statistical evidence for the increased 
incorporation of empirical evidence); Richard H. McAdams and Thomas S. Ulen, 
“Symposium: Empirical and Experimental Methods of Law: Introduction”, 2002 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. (2002) 789, p. 791 (noting that “there are signs that empirical and experimental 
methods are becoming more common in legal scholarship”).
186. For instance, of about 100 empirical articles published in the Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies – the only peer-reviewed outlet devoted solely to such research – since its 
inception in 2004 (through the March 2008 issue), only 4 articles concerned experimental 
tests of legally-relevant psychological processes (3 in 2006 and 1 in 2007). 
with professional and experienced decision makers,183 albeit usually not in the legal 
domain.184 Whether a given instance of legal decision making is fundamentally 
different from a similar problem faced, say, in medical or business decision making 
will therefore ultimately depend on the specific circumstances at hand.
2. Direct Empirical Tests
The second genre in the behavioral analysis of law involves direct tests of behavioral 
phenomena in legal settings. Studies in this genre examine whether a given phenomenon 
is manifested in a legal context, usually following hypotheses based on evidence from 
non-legal domains. Direct tests take two general forms, involving either observational 
tests of legal real-world (“field”) data or experimental studies in legal settings. Both
methodologies avoid some of the problems inherent in theoretical applications of non-
legal findings, but are also subject to their own set of limitations.
Observational tests of legal questions have become increasingly popular 
in recent decades, although still relatively uncommon compared to traditional 
legal scholarship.185 Yet, these tests rarely seek to resolve behavioral questions. 
Typically, observational scholars study empirical regularities in data on legal 
institutions – such as courts and administrative agencies – or legal decision makers – 
such as judges or litigants. Only occasionally do such studies examine the impact of 
psychological variables on legally relevant decision making.186 
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187. Some exceptions include Jeremy Blumenthal of Syracuse, Yuval Feldman of Bar Ilan 
University, Gregory Mitchell of Virginia, and Jeffrey Rachlinski of Cornell. Of course, 
there are many other legal scholars with psychological training which work predominantly 
within the “old” law and psychology paradigm (relevant journals are Law and Human 
Behavior, and Behavioral Sciences and the Law).
188. This example is based on Tor, Gazal-Ayal and Garcia, Plea Offers (supra note 139).
189. See, id., pp. 25-26.
190. The researcher may be aware, for instance, of famous cases of seemingly irrational plea 
rejections by defendants, who consequently suffered server consequences but were later 
proven innocent. One illustrative case is Kelly Jarrett’s, who rejected a plea bargain for 
time served on moral grounds, knowing that she was very likely to serve decades more in 
jail because of her refusal. See, id., n. 5 (providing further details and references).
191. See supra Part II.A.3.
Two factors that contribute to the rarity of behaviorally oriented observational tests 
are, first, the interests of empirical-observational legal scholars; and, second, the nature
of behavioral phenomena. Legal scholars with observational interests have a variety 
of interdisciplinary backgrounds, but most have not been trained as psychologists.187 
These scholars are therefore interested in obtaining and analyzing observational data 
about legal rules and institutions, but less concerned about the specific psychological
antecedents of legally-relevant behavior. Moreover, those psychological antecedents 
that are the focus of the behavioral approach are often difficult to study by observational
methods, as the following example will illustrate.
A behavioral scholar may hypothesize that considerations of justice or fairness, 
which are typically ignored in the economic analysis of plea bargaining, will lead 
innocent criminal defendants to reject plea offers that culpable defendants with 
similar trial prospects will accept.188 If established, such a phenomenon would have 
important ramifications for the legal regulation of plea bargaining.189 The intuition
underlying such a hypothesis may come from anecdotal observations of defendants’ 
behavior190 or perhaps from the researcher’s familiarity with the extensive body of 
behavioral evidence on the impact of fairness considerations on decision making in 
other domains.191 
In any event, to make policy recommendations in the plea bargaining context one 
would clearly prefer to adduce direct evidence on defendants’ plea behavior. The 
problem is that to obtain such evidence the researcher would have to collect data 
on plea offer and acceptance terms that is not publicly available. Once collected, 
moreover, the data would have to be analyzed separately for innocent and culpable 
defendants to determine whether there are any systematic differences between the two 
groups. This, however, is an impossible task, since defendants’ objective culpability – 
as opposed to their trial outcomes – is typically unknown.
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192. For a discussion of the various issues raised by the suggested analysis of exoneration data 
for the present purposes see: Tor, Gazal-Ayal and Garcia, Plea Offers (supra note 139) pp. 
5-6.
193. See, id., p. 7 (discussing alternative explanation for the striking difference between guilty 
plea rates among the exonerated and those of the general defendant population). 
194. E.g., Russell Korobkin, “Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics”, 32 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. (2005) 781, p. 786:
 The most obvious is that careful empirical testing of law-relevant behavior in 
specifically defined settings is both time- and resource-intensive, and the list
of topics that would benefit from such study is quite long compared to the list
of scholars doing this work. Potentially even more troubling, however, is that 
the data required for such studies is often impossible (or virtually impossible) 
to obtain and, even when it can be obtained, the results themselves or the 
implications to be drawn from the results will often be contestable and 
ultimately indeterminate.
195. In empirical research parlance, this is a problem of internal validity See, e.g., Rosenthal 
and Rosnow (supra note 166) pp. 209-212 (“[c]ausal inference ... depends (a) not only on 
operationalizing a reliable relationship between an event and its presumed cause ... as well 
as (b) providing some proof that the cause preceded the effect ... but also on (c) ruling out 
plausible rival explanations (internal validity).) (emphasis added), pp. 257-59 (discussing 
the problem of multiple confounding covariates in the experimental context). See also 
Korobkin (supra note 194) and n. 23.
As a partial solution to this problem, the researcher may seek indirect empirical 
evidence of a relationship between plea behavior and culpability. Such evidence may 
be found, for example, in databases that collect exoneration cases – that is, cases 
where criminal defendants who were judged guilty were later proven innocent. If 
the fairness hypothesis is correct, there should be a systematic difference between 
the plea rates of the exonerated and the general defendant population.192 Even such 
an important finding, however, would not directly address the behavioral hypothesis,
because variables other than considerations of fairness or justice may cause systematic 
differences between the real-world plea behavior of the innocent and the culpable. 
For instance, real-world innocents may well be more reluctant to plea if they correctly 
believe their acquittal odds are higher than those of their culpable counterparts, based 
on private information they cannot convincingly convey to prosecutors. Alternatively, 
innocents’ behavior may reflect overoptimism regarding their trial prospects rather
than a taste for justice or fairness.193 
As the plea bargaining example illustrates, observational tests of real-world data are 
extremely valuable, but often difficult to conduct.194 Even where feasible, moreover,
their results may be subject to multiple interpretations,195 which frequently may lead 
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196. Cf. Colin F. Camerer and Eric Talley, “Experimental Law and Economics”, 3 available at 
[http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/HLEDec282004.doc] (forthcoming in 2 Handbbok 
of Law and Economics (A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell- eds.,) (“Nevertheless, 
as we elaborate below, empirical approaches suffer from the fact that it is often difficult to
stage (much less to observe by happenstance) a truly natural experiment in the real world 
that implies clear causal conclusions. Because laboratory approaches excel in just this 
respect, at the very least good experimental designs are likely to provide a complementary 
and confirmatory check on empirical methods.”).
197. For a discussion of the normative implications of innocents’ plea rejections see Tor et al., 
Plea Offers (supra note 139) pp. 25-28. 
198. Cf. Camerer and Loewenstein (supra note 150) p. 7 (“Experiments played a large role in 
the initial phase of behavioral economics because experimental control is exceptionally 
helpful for distinguishing behavioral explanations from standard ones.”) (emphasis 
added). 
199. Note there are other kinds of experiments that are not discussed here. See: Rosenthal 
and Rosnow (supra note 166) p. 188. Field experiments that study decision making 
in the specific context of interest, for instance, seek to retain experimental control,
while increasing the external validity of the subject pool. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, 
“The Behavioral Foundations of Trade Secrets: Tangibility, Authorship, and Legality”, 
3 J. Emp. Leg. Stud. (2006) 197 (using a non-random sample of silicon valley high-tech 
employees). 
200. See, e.g., Rosenthal and Rosnow (supra note 166) p. 70; George W. Snedecor and William 
G. Chocran, Statistical Methods (8th Ed. 1989) pp. 95-96 (“Randomization gives each 
treatment an equal chance of being allotted to any subject ... exactly as is assumed in 
the theory of probability ... A great virtue of randomization is that it protects against 
unsuspected sources of bias.”) (emphasis in the original). See also Camerer and Talley 
to different legal policy recommendations.196 To illustrate, rational plea rejections 
by innocents who possess private information may raise no policy concerns. On the 
other hand, overoptimistic rejections by innocents who would have accepted the plea 
offers had they correctly estimated their trial prospects may present a problem that 
plea bargain law should take into account.197 All in all, therefore, observational tests 
of naturally occurring data may possess superior external validity, but are often not 
only difficult to conduct but also inconclusive, especially regarding the psychological
antecedents of behavior. When these underlying causes are legally significant, as is
frequently the case, behavioral scholars may need to turn to experimental methods.198
The basic logic of experiments is straightforward and not unique to behavioral 
decision research. In the most common type of study, the controlled randomized 
experiment,199 the researcher randomly assigns the participants to two (or more) 
groups, to avoid a systematic difference between the participants in the two groups.200 
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(supra note 196) p. 6 (“Random assignment is perhaps the most foundational element of a 
valuable experiment.”) 
201. For a detailed, non-technical, discussion of the logic and approach of controlled 
randomized experiments see: Rosenthal and Rosnow (supra note 166) pp. 69-91.
202. See also id., pp. 74-82 (providing further background).
203. Note that there is an inherent tension between the desire to replicate as closely as possible 
the real-world context within which relevant behaviors take place and the paramount need – 
that very justification of the experimental method – to control the experimental setting and
eliminate potential confounds.
204. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, “Experimental Law and Economics”, Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest- eds., 1999) pp. 539, 
540 (“A constant methodological concern, however, is an experiment’s ‘parallelism’ or 
‘external validity’ – the degree to which the results may be generalized to populations and 
behavior outside the experiment”). External validity was also discussed supra notes 181-
183 and the accompanying text.
205. There are researchers who argue, however, that the value of laboratory experiments is 
specifically in testing theories and examining universal phenomena in controlled and more
abstract environments. See, e.g., Douglas G. Mook, “In Defense of External Invalidity”, 
38 Am. Psychol. (1983) 379. 
The treatment is then administered to one group (the experimental group) but not to the 
other (the control group). The data from both groups are then collected, and analyzed 
by statistical procedures to determine whether the treatment has had any effect on the 
outcomes of the experimental group as compared to the control group.201
The central characteristics of experiments are randomization and control, 
which allow the experimenter to draw conclusions about the causal effects of the 
experimental treatment.202 The controlled randomized experiment therefore possesses 
some advantages over empirical observational studies of naturally occurring data, 
where randomization and control generally are not possible. Yet the experiment is 
inevitably removed from the natural legal environment in a number of important 
respects: not only do experimental participants often differ from those legal actors of 
interest, but the controlled experimental design must fall short of replicating the full 
richness of the real-world setting of legal interest.203 These and related characteristics 
of experiments thus tend to limit their external validity.204
Over time, however, experimental researchers have developed various means to 
address external validity problems, by using different types of participants, infusing 
experimental designs with greater realism, and more.205 By now there is also a 
significant body of evidence showing how even simulation or survey studies using,
say, college and university students – as is often the case in psychology experiments – 
typically generate results resembling those of experiments using more realistic 
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206. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay and Brad J. Bushman, “Research in the 
Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?”, 8 Current Directions in Psychological 
Science (1999) 3 (comparing findings from the lab and the field across a range of
psychological domains and finding considerable correspondence).
207. Colin F. Camerer and and Robyn M. Hogarth, “The Effects of Financial Incentives in 
Experiments: A Review and Capital–Labor–Production Framework”, 19 Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty (1999) 7. This is not to say that financial incentives do not matter (see,
e.g., Vernon L. Smith, “Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality”, 5 Experim. Econ. 
(2002) 91, pp. 101-102; Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker, “Monetary Rewards 
and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics”, 31 Econ. Inq. (1993) 245 (concluding 
based on a review of experimental economics studies that increased financial incentives
reduce the variances in participants’ performance and also tend to improve its quality)), 
but rather that commonly used levels of financial incentives generally do not change
mean statistics, although they sometimes reduce variance in responses, and may even 
introduce confounds into the design by either framing the experiment as one concerning 
market behavior or because they interact with the experimental dependant variables. 
See also: Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All”, 115 Q. 
J. Econ. (2000) 791 (providing evidence that low financial incentives lead to worse
performance than no incentives, but high incentives improve performance); Ondrej 
Rydvak and Andreas Ortmann, “How Financial Incentives and Cognitive Abilities Affect 
Task Performance in Laboratory Settings: An Illustration”, 85 Econ. Letters (2004) 315 
(showing through a reanalysis of the data from Gneezy and Rustichini that differences 
in intelligence between participants are at least twice as important for performance 
compared to financial incentives); Dan N. Stone and David A. Ziebart, “A Model of
Financial Incentive Effects in Decision Making”, 61 Org. Behav. And Hum. Dec. Proc. 
(1995) 250 (providing evidence that financial incentives can both improve performance
via increased motivation and diminish it by generating negative effect). Cf., e.g., Tor, 
Experimental Law and Economics (supra note 128) pp. 27-28 (providing an example of 
how the use of monetary incentives in a given study may have contributed to the lack of 
an experimental effect). 
208. See: Camerer and Talley (supra note 196) p. 2 (“Few methodological approaches to the 
study of law that have received more recent attention than experimental methods. While 
virtually absent from the pages of law reviews and law and economics journals just 
participants and designs.206 Similarly, the results of decision-making studies using 
monetary incentives for performance largely correspond with those of psychological 
experiments, which often do not rely on financial incentives.207
Behavioral scholars have already conducted experimental tests of some legal 
questions, although such tests are still uncommon.208 Researchers have used 
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a decade ago, experimental studies (or articles purporting to be inspired by the results 
of such studies) have become a veritable staple consumption good for today’s legal 
scholars.”) Note that a careful reading of Camerer and Talley’s upbeat message regarding 
the popularity of experimental studies also includes the proportionately dominant genre of 
theoretical applications (“inspired” by others’ experimental results).
209. E.g., Rachlinski (supra note 103). 
210. E.g., Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer (supra note 79).
211. E.g., Korobkin, Status Quo bias (supra note 127); Korobkin, Endowment Effect (supra 
note 112). 
212. E.g., Lewinson-Zamir (supra note 148); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Forest Jourden, 
“Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership”, 51 Vand. L. Rev. (1998) 1541.
213. Kelman, Rottenstreich and Tversky (supra note 91).
214. E.g., Mook (supra note 205) p. 386 (“[o]bviously we must move beyond a simple count of 
differences and think through what the effect of each one is likely to be.”).
215. Alternatively, research programs may similarly seek to complement laboratory 
experiments with other methodologies, such as field experiments. See supra note 198.
Such combinations are becoming increasingly common in decision research. A quick 
perusal of the leading journal of experimental work in that field – Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes – reveals that every one of the last 5 volumes (Vols. 100-
104) contained between 1 and 4 articles that focused on observational or field data or
combined such data with traditional laboratory experiments. 
experimental methods to examine the effects of framing on litigation behavior;209 the 
impact of the self-serving bias on settlement;210 the role of the status-quo bias and 
endowment effect in contractual choices211 and legal remedies;212 and how the structure 
and context of rules and procedures shapes legal decision making;213 to name some 
examples. However, even such controlled randomized experiments, which directly 
study legal questions, must still consider external validity issues, since they necessarily 
remain removed from the natural legal settings. Of course, many differences between 
the experimental setting and the legal context of interest may have negligible impact 
on the phenomena of interest, but other differences may truly limit the relevance of 
specific experimental findings.214
Observational tests and experimental methods thus possess different strengths and 
weaknesses, and may in fact be complementary means of generating direct evidence 
regarding behavioral phenomena of legal interest. Sometimes, such complementarities 
may be brought to light in an integrated research program.215 In the plea bargaining 
example, for instance, controlled randomized experiments supplemented the 
indicative, real-world, findings generated by observational methods, by identifying
some of the psychological antecedents of the differential behavior of innocent and 
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216. Tor, Gazal-Ayal and Garcia, Plea Offers (supra note 139).
217. Id. For another example of a combining experimental and observational research in 
behavioral legal research see: Rachlinski (supra note 103).
culpable defendants. To do this, the experiments controlled for some confounding 
variables that may have contributed to the observational evidence, such as private 
information and expected sanctions. They also used hypothetical questionnaires and 
student participants, in a setting removed from the criminal justice system, showing 
that innocence still exerts a significant independent impact on plea acceptance even
in such highly simplified and controlled settings.216 Standing alone, the external
validity of these experimental studies would have been severely constrained, but 
they were able to control for real-world confounds which plague the observational 
evidence, using hypothetical scenarios that earlier plea bargaining studies already 
shown to produce results similar to those of experiments using criminal convicts as 
participants.217 
Beyond overcoming validity concerns, however, the observational and experimental 
methods of empirical research allow scholars to generate new, legally relevant data. 
New data generation, which is still uncommon in legal scholarship, is especially 
beneficial in circumstances where legal debates are based on limited evidence. For
instance, the voluminous literature that debates the merits and proper boundaries of 
plea bargains includes complex arguments regarding the behavior of defendants, 
prosecutors, judges, and more, based on either scholarly intuitions or theoretical 
models, but typically not on empirical evidence. The introduction of relevant empirical 
evidence in these common cases where it is usually lacking may therefore inform 
the various positions in extant debates. It can also promote the further generation of 
empirical research by those who would like to challenge the conclusions of a given set 
of direct findings, thereby further enriching legal scholarship.
Despite the many benefits of direct empirical tests, however, their share in the
growing mass of behavioral research in law is still limited. For one, empirical 
scholarship requires some training in observational or experimental methods, which 
most legal scholars do not possess. Moreover, for the reasons noted above, those legal 
scholars familiar with empirical observational research generally do not examine 
behavioral questions, while the few who do conduct experiments must also face an 
audience unfamiliar with, and therefore often suspicious of, experimental methods. 
This latter communication barrier is also exacerbated by the current lack of an 
experimental legal methodology, adapted to the specific concerns and priorities of legal
scholars. A similar process has occurred in the field of economics, where experimental
methods were uncommon until a few decades ago. When economists became aware of 
the contribution experimental tests could make to their discipline, they first borrowed
already well-established experimental psychology methods. Since then, behavioral 
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218. Camerer and Loewenstein (supra note 150) p. 8 (noting, in addition, that after an initial 
period where experiments were the main source of data collection, behavioral economists 
started using observational and other methods to study their subject-matter of interest.)
219. Id. See also: Ralph hertwing and Andreas Ortmann, “Experimental Practices in Economics: 
A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?”, 24 Behav. and Brain. Sci. (2001) 383 
(describing the experimental practices of experimental economists).
220. E.g. Camerer and Talley (supra note 196) p. 10-12. 
221. See Tor, Experimental Law and Economics (supra note 128) p. 28. 
222. However, because of researchers’ resources constraints, the monetary incentives 
commonly given by experimenters are quite small, and may therefore not provide 
appropriate motivation. 
223. See the evidence discussed supra note 209. See also infra note 252 and the accompanying 
text (discussing the effects of framing a task as market related on participants’ behavior),
economists, who are interested in the lessons of psychology for economics, have 
retained most of the methodological practices of experimental psychology.218 Other 
researchers, known as experimental economists, however, have over time adapted the 
experimental psychological methodology, the better to examine non-psychological 
questions about economic behavior.219 
Experimental economics thus differs from experimental psychology (and therefore, 
largely, from experiments in behavioral economics as well) in several important 
respects, which reflect its paramount focus on economic, rather than psychological,
questions. For example, experimental economists emphasize the provision of monetary 
incentives for performance to participants; the measurement of overt behavior rather 
than verbal responses; the avoidance of deception at all costs; the use of numerous 
repeated trials; and the design of experiments with a high degree of abstraction.220 
These idiosyncratic experimental economics conventions illustrate how extant 
experimental methods may be adapted to suit new research priorities. 
Importantly, some specific experimental economics conventions may be useful
for legal scholarship, at least occasionally, although the practices of experimental 
psychology and behavioral economics typically will be better suited for the task.221 
Motivating participants with monetary incentives for performance may be beneficial,
for instance, when studying legally relevant phenomena in economic settings.222 Many 
other legal questions, however, including those that frequently concern behavioral 
scholars, address situations where non-monetary factors – such as social norms, 
fairness, or other social preferences – play a pivotal role. In these settings, extensive 
reliance on monetary performance incentives may create undesirable demand effects 
and bias experimental results.223 
Similarly, the abstract designs favored by experimental economists may be 
preferable when testing general patterns of economic behavior, but not for the study 
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224. See: Rachlinski (supra note 13) pp. 764-765; Tor, Experimental Law and Economics 
(supra note 128) p. 28. 
225. Direct empirical tests also complement theoretical applications by providing new data 
that can lead to theory revisions and developments, as is commonly done in the sciences. 
Cf. Thomas S. Ulen, “A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the 
Scientific Method in the Study of Law”, 2002 U. Ill. R. Rev. (2002) 875 (discussing at
length the scientific method, the use of empirical evidence to inform theory, and its
increasing relevance for the law).
226. Korobkin, Status Quo Bias (supra note 127).
of behavior within legal and social institutions. In most situations that interest legal 
scholars, for instance, the law plays a pivotal role – explicitly or implicitly – in priming 
and constructing preferences, values, norms, and more. Although an experimental 
design that abstracts away from these institutional settings may provide interesting 
insights about economic behavior, it may be of limited relevance for legal analysis.224
Hence, while current experimental studies in law tend to apply the extant 
methodology of either experimental psychology or experimental economics, the 
future use of experimental legal methods may benefit from the development a new
experimental variant, better suited to the interests of legal scholars.
3. Complements or Substitutes?
Much like the relationship between the empirical methodologies of observational 
and experimental studies, the two overarching behavioral genres – of theoretical 
applications and direct empirical tests – can clearly complement one another since 
they possess different strengths and weaknesses. The production and communication 
of theoretical applications are more natural to legal scholars. Such applications can 
also be based on robust findings developed outside law and may inform a broad range
of legal analyses. At the same time, however, we have seen that effective theoretical 
applications require close familiarity with the details of extant behavioral findings and
inevitably remain open to significant external validity challenges. Direct empirical
tests, on the other hand, are necessarily focused and limited in scope. They also face 
higher production and communication barriers, limitations on the raw data available 
for study, and a current lack of a specific legal methodology.
Some problems, therefore, are better addressed by one genre or the other, but in 
many instances theoretical applications and direct empirical tests can be combined to 
offer a more compelling, behavioral analysis.225 Korobkin’s analysis of the impact of 
default rules of contract law on contractual outcomes illustrates this point.226 To make 
his argument more convincing, Korobkin marshals the extensive body of behavioral 
research on the endowment effect and the status-quo bias, also showing how these 
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227. Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, id., pp. 625-633.
228. Id., pp. 633-660. For another example of an integrated approach see Avishalom Tor and 
Dotan Oliar, “Incentives to Create under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration: 
Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft”, 36 Loyola of L.A. 
L. Rev. (2002) 437 (combining a theoretical application of extant behavioral findings
with simple experimental tests to analyze the likely impact of changes in the duration of 
copyright protection).
229. Cf. Robert J. MacCoun, “Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock, Amateur and
Professional”, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2005) 511, p. 518 (stating that when making research 
choices, scholars should be aware of this tradeoff and sometimes prefer the development 
of a good theory that is useful for policy makers to conducting additional direct empirical 
tests of limited theoretical importance). 
230. In time, moreover, the further development of behavioral scholarship may create a 
community of scholars who are able to build on each other’s findings.
231. The distinction between “basic” and “applied” science is highly controversial, both in 
the sciences general and in psychology specifically. See, e.g., Advances In Applied Socail
phenomena are robust and appear in relevant decision environments.227 He concedes, 
however, that default rules may differ in important respects from the extra-legal 
context studied elsewhere, and therefore conducts a series of controlled experimental 
tests, showing that default rules can indeed impact contractual decisions.228
Despite their beneficial complementarities, however, there is also some tension
between the two genres, at least from the perspective of the individual researcher. 
Given limited resources, one must always trade off the benefits of acquiring and
employing new methodologies – like those used in direct empirical tests – against their 
costs. Moreover, because any given empirical test can generate only a limited amount 
of data, researchers who focus on the generation of new evidence may find it difficult
to provide a sufficient basis for legal policy recommendations.229 This difficulty can
be partly overcome, though not completely mitigated, by combining the two empirical 
genres, as suggested above.230 
IV. Basic Research Gaps 
The definition of the behavioral approach as the application of empirical behavioral
evidence to legal analysis also gives rise to the third claim made here – namely, that the 
behavioral approach faces a series of “gaps,” between basic research findings and some
of the empirical evidence needed for a fully effective legal analysis. Until these gaps 
are bridged the explanatory power of the behavioral approach may remain limited. 
Most behavioral decision research is “basic,” in that it is concerned with universal 
relationships among psychological variables and judgment and decision behavior.231 
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Psychology (Michal J. Saks and Robert F. Kidd- eds., 1980) p. 1 (numerous authors 
addressing this controversy in the social psychological context). This controversy is not 
material for the present purposes, which simply use the terminology to highlight that 
the behavioral analysis of law uses empirical findings about general patterns of human
behavior to address specific legal issues.
232. The application of basic decision research is widespread. See, e.g., Judgment and 
Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Terry Connoly, Hal R. Arkes and Kenneth 
R. Hammond- eds., 2d ed., 2000) (containing applications to public policy, economics, 
medicine, and more).
233. Applied decision research may therefore also contribute to basic research by revealing 
its own lacunae and shortcomings. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, “The Real World: What 
Good is It?”, 65 Org. Beahv. And Hum. Dec. Proc. (1996) 232, p. 232; Karl H. Teigen, 
“Decision-Making in Two Worlds”, 65 Org. Beahv. And Hum. Dec. Proc. (1996) 249, p. 
251 (“Real-world situations are not easily, and certainly never completely, captured by the 
vocabulary of the lab. On the other hand, these situations form a gold mine for extracting 
new questions (rather than new answers).”).
234. A non-exhaustive list of additional significant shrinking-gap areas may include the role of
individual differences in judgment and decision making (see, e.g., Keith E. Stanovich and 
Richard F. West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality 
Debate”, 23 Behav. and Brain. Sci. (2000) 645 (examining this issue in a target article 
followed by extensive peer commentary); the impact of affect on judgment and decision 
The behavioral analysis of law, on the other hand, is fundamentally “applied,” 232 
insofar as it addresses legal questions based on behavioral insights. The behavioral 
approach, therefore, is largely dependent on decision research to generate basic 
findings on systematic behavioral patterns. Despite the extensive research that already
exists in this area, however, many fundamental questions remain unresolved, often 
because researchers have yet to direct significant attention to them.233
Instead of attempting to compile a comprehensive list of all basic research gaps, 
the following sections focus on some gaps that are especially significant for legal
scholarship. Those discussed here may be classified into the three general categories:
shrinking gaps, second-order gaps, and institutional gaps, each of which is addressed 
in turn.
A. Shrinking Gaps: Boundary Conditions and Debiasing
Shrinking gaps are basic research gaps in areas that in the past, for various reasons, 
received less attention from decision making scholars, but that researchers increasingly 
study. Empirical evidence in these areas is therefore more limited than in many other 
decision making domains, but the legal analyst may still find valuable grist for his
mill. While shrinking gaps exist in numerous areas of decision research,234 this section 
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making (see, e.g., Norbert Schwarz, “Emotion, Cognition, and Decision Making”, 14 
Cog. And Emotion (2000) 433 (describing the state of the art at the time and opening a 
special issue on the topic)); and the study of specific behavioral phenomena in strategic
environments (see generally Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory (supra note 130) (a highly 
readable and thorough review of experimental results in this area).
235. See supra notes 165-172 and the accompanying text. Cf. Drew Fudenberg, “Advancing 
Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics”, 44 J. Econ. Lit. (2006) 694, p. 697 (asserting 
that behavioral findings reveal, for instance, many judgmental errors but do not specify
their boundary conditions).
236. Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, “Debiasing through Law”, 35 J. Leg. Stud. (2006) 
199.
237. E.g., Baruch Fischhoff, “Debiasing”, Judgment Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) p. 422.
238. See, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) p. 3 
(justifying this focus by analogizing JDM research to the study of visual perception via 
optical illusions). 
239. See, e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten (supra note 18); Payne, Bettman and Johnson (supra note 
18); Rachlinski, “New” Law and Psychology (supra note 13). See also infra notes 88-93 
and the accompanying text (discussing the effect of context on decision processes).
illustrates their importance by examining extant research on boundary conditions and 
debiasing, an area that has broad relevance for legal analysis.
Legal applications of concrete empirical findings, as opposed to theoretical,
universal, constructs, must account for boundary conditions, identifying the specific
circumstances necessary for different phenomena to be manifested.235 Beyond 
considering those natural boundary conditions, however, the legal analyst must go 
still farther and examine the potential of the legal system actively to debias decision 
makers and thereby eliminate or reduce decision errors.236 Despite the limited past 
interest in the study of boundary conditions and debiasing among behavioral decision 
researchers, recent years have seen scholars increasingly examining these questions, 
experimentally and theoretically alike.237 
The identification of boundary conditions is important for basic research, as
well as for behavioral-legal applications, since understanding when phenomena 
come into existence and when they disappear can provide insight into the nature of 
these phenomena. In fact, the traditional focus of decision researchers – including 
the influential “heuristics and biases” research program – on studying errors and
deviations from normative benchmarks already emphasizes the importance of 
boundary conditions research.238 Moreover, one of the most important general insights 
of behavioral decision research is that human behavior is highly context-dependent – 
namely, that processes of judgment and choice depend on the environment within 
which people operate.239 
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F. West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?”, 
Heuristics and Biases (supra note 25) p. 421, 436 (note that this is a different version from 
the article cited supra note 236 despite the similar name). 
241. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage, “How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning 
Without Instruction: Frequency Formats”, 102 Psychol. Rev. (1995) 684 (showing that 
biases due to base rate neglect are reduced when information is presented in a frequency 
– instead of a probability – format); Nathan Novemsky and Daniel Kahenman, “The 
Boundaries of Loss Aversion”, 42 J. Market (2005) 119 (exploring the boundary 
conditions of loss aversion).
242. Fischhoff (supra note 67); Neil D. Weinestein and William M. Klein, “Resistance of 
Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions”, Heuristics and Biases (supra note 
25) p. 313. See also: Jolls and Sunstein (supra note 71) (examining extant behavioral 
evidence is the law’s debiasing function). 
243. E.g., Kahneman and Frederick (supra note 25); Steven A. Sloman, “Two Systems of 
Reasoning”, Heuristics and Biases (supra note 25) p. 379; Paul Slovic, Melissa L. 
Finucane, Ellen Peters and Donald G. MacGregor, “Risk As Analysis and Risk As 
Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality”, 24 Risk Anal. 
(2004) 311 (distinguishing between an “analytical” and an “experiential” system). Dual-
process theories in psychology come in many varieties. See generally: Dual- Process 
Theories in Social Psychology (Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope- eds., 1999); Kenneth R. 
Hammond, Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, 
Unavoidable Injustice (1996) pp. 60, 84-93 (discussing the long-standing distinction 
between intuition and analysis and its manifestation in different approaches to the 
psychology of judgment). Cf. also Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (1986) 
pp. 11-14 (more radically distinguishing between the paradigmatic and the narrative 
“modes of thought”). 
The study of boundary conditions and debiasing concerns three related levels of 
analysis: first, researchers examine those general boundaries of intuitive judgment
wherein people rely on heuristic processes of judgment and choice.240 Second, the 
study of different phenomena also seeks to identify their specific boundaries.241 Third
and related, once systematic errors are found, researchers often examine whether 
and how it is possible to debias decision makers, in an attempt to overcome these 
errors.242
At the level of general boundaries, the experimental evidence suggests that decision 
processes are “dual-process” operations, which may be divided into two broad 
categories, sometimes known as System 1 and System 2.243 System 1 encompasses those 
intuitive processes of judgment and choice that are largely automatic and effortless, 
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245. E.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson (supra note 47) p. 8 (finding the affect
heuristic impacted judgments of benefits and risks much more powerfully under time
pressure). 
246. See generally: Kahneman and Frederick (supra note 25) pp. 52, 57-59.
247. For a recent contribution that develops a general theory of judging based on the dual-
process theory of decision making operations see: Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and 
Andrew J. Wistrich, “Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases”, 93 Cornell L. 
Rev. (2007) 1. See also: Mitchell, Unwarranted Pessimism (supra note 13) fn. 232 and the 
accompanying text (suggesting that common presence of system 2 operations suggests the 
legal analysis should not take for granted that those social stereotypes employed by system 
1 will routinely bias judgments). 
rely on heuristic operations that are not fully conscious, and produce rapid responses 
to problems as they arise. The intuitive operations of system 1 allow individuals to 
function effectively in a complex world despite their limitations, but also produce 
those myriad deviations from rational action, examined at length in Part II above. 
System 2, on the other hand, uses controlled, deductive, and effortful processes, 
which are conscious and slower in producing their solutions, such as when people 
try to solve a mathematical problem based on mathematical rules. System 2 monitors 
the responses of system 1 for quality, and sometimes attempts to correct or override 
them.244 Where this monitoring is successful, as it often is, the “side effects” of system 
1 are not manifested, such as where instead of quickly estimating the answer to a 
problem, one is able to apply the formal operation and reach a precise and unbiased 
answer. 
Hence, the behavioral analysis of law should examine the conditions that facilitate or 
inhibit system 2 operations, to determine where system 1’s side-effects are likely to be 
of greater legal concern. For example, there is evidence that time pressure diminishes 
the ability of the slower system 2 to correct system 1.245 Other features of both the task – 
such as the format in which information is presented – and the individual decision 
maker including statistical sophistication, intelligence, and more – similarly moderate 
system 2 corrections.246 Consequently, the legal analyst should not necessarily expect 
routinely to observe system 1 biases in slow, deliberate, rule-based legal decisions, 
such as those made by judges or lawyers analyzing the applicability of a specific rule
to a given set of facts. However, the same decision makers will be more prone to 
exhibiting system 1 errors when forced to make rapid judgments under pressure, such 
as when ruling on a motion during a trial hearing.247
Beyond the study of the general boundaries of intuitive judgment and decision 
making, the legal analyst should also take into account the growing body of research 
on the specific boundaries of decision-making phenomena. In the area of probabilistic
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induced value tokens). 
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252. But see: Ian Bateman, Alistair Munro, Bruce Rhodes and Chris Starmer, “A Test of the 
Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences”, 112 Q. J. Econ. (1997) 479 (finding some
loss aversion for buyers using monetary payoffs as well); Ian Bateman, Daniel Kahneman, 
Alistair Munro, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden, “Testing Competing Models of 
Loss Aversion: An Adversarial Collaboration”, 89 J. Pub. Econ. (2005) 1561 (same); 
Novemsky and Kahenman (supra note 243) p. 120 (briefly discussing these and related
findings).
253. Novemsky and Kahenman, id., p. 125. See also: Richard H. Thaler, “Mental Accounting 
and Consumer Choice”, 4 Market. Sci. (1985) 199; Richard H. Thaler, “Mental Accounting 
Matters”, Advances in Behavioral Economics (supra note 98) p. 75 (reviewing evidence 
for the non-fungibility of money placed in different mental accounts, such as “savings” vs. 
“entertainment”).
judgments, for example, evidence exists that decision makers perform better 
when information is presented in a relative-frequency format (1 in 10) instead of a 
probabilistic format (10%).248 A legal fact-finder may thus more rationally integrate
frequency information, such as “the risk of death due to anesthesia is 1 in 5000,” than 
comparable probabilistic information – namely, “the risk of death due to anesthesia is 
0.02%.” 
The identification of specific boundary conditions is legally significant in the
domain of choice as well. For instance, we have seen that loss aversion, where negative 
changes (losses) from a reference point loom larger than positive ones (gains), and 
related phenomena have numerous implications for law and policy, from legislation 
and regulation to litigation, negotiation, contract law, and more.249 However, despite 
its robustness and generality, loss aversion is an empirical, psychological, effect, hence 
subject to boundary conditions. In fact, some early studies that provided evidence of 
loss aversion in experimental market settings already found that participants did not 
exhibit loss aversion when trading chips with fixed monetary value.250 Explaining this
result, researchers argued that there is no loss aversion in routine transactions,251 which 
may also explain why real-world merchants, for instance, do not appear to exhibit 
loss aversion when trading their products.252 Even consumers do not generally exhibit 
loss aversion for money allocated for purchases, except when the expense exceeds 
their perceived “spending budget.”253 In addition to this “exchange good” boundary 
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260. See, e.g., Jolls and Sunstein (supra note 71). See also: Amitai Aviram, “Bias Arbitrage”, 64 
Wash and Lee L. Rev. 789 (2007) (arguing that both government actors and private parties 
have an incentive to debias public risk perceptions when they can reap private benefits).
261. E.g. Richard A. Posner, “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law”, 50 Stan. 
L. Rev. (1998) 1551, p. 1575 (“One might have thought the behavioral economics had at 
of loss aversion,254 moreover, recent studies suggest that loss aversion attaches to 
the perceived benefits of the good rather than to its objective attributes. For this
reason, goods with different characteristics (say, simple CD players of two different 
brands) can be exchanged without loss aversion if they provide similar psychological 
benefits.255 More specifically, this feature also explains why loss version diminishes in
exchanges that involve goods that are close substitutes for each other.256
The specific boundaries of loss aversion can also help explain some legally relevant
phenomena, such as in the area of consumer protection. Marketers, for example, may 
employ trade-in offers partly to overcome loss aversion. To wit, loss aversion may 
make consumers reluctant to buy new durable goods if the “upgrade” requires them to 
give up a good they already possess and still perceive as valuable. A trade-in offer, on 
the other hand, may reduce loss aversion and increase consumers’ willingness to buy 
new durable goods by leading them to view the old good both as a means for buying 
the new one and as belonging to the same psychological budget or account.257 Of 
course, the policy implications of such a practice are not necessarily negative, since 
loss aversion and related phenomena may impede efficient trades.258 Trade-in offers
may also reduce transaction costs and provide consumers with other benefits. At the
same time, however, sellers are likely to exploit these effects, which can promote the 
inefficient and frequent “upgrading” of consumer goods, or simply transfer wealth
from consumers to sellers.259 
Finally, at the third level of analysis, the growing body of experimental and 
theoretical research on debiasing has clear legal significance, which behaviorally
oriented scholars have already begun exploring.260 The attractiveness of debiasing 
from a legal perspective is clear: the elimination, even the reduction, of decision 
makers’ systematic errors of judgment and choice is socially beneficial when these
mistakes lead to suboptimal behavior.261 However, the empirical literature on 
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See Jolls and Sunstein (supra note 71) p. 200 (“Boundedly rational behavior might be, and 
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approach, which seeks to exploit those specific boundary conditions described above
when designing the legal environment. Cf. Joshua Kleyman and Kaye Brown, “Debias 
the Environment Instead of the Judge: An Alternative Approach to Reducing Error in 
Diagnostic (and Other) Judgment”, 49 Cognition (1993) p. 97 (suggesting that modifying 
the environment to fit cognitive processes to reduce bias can serve as a partial alternative
to the traditional focus on modifying decision makers’ cognitive processes to fit the tasks
they face and providing evidence for the possiblity and limits of such debiasing).
263. Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein and Samuel Issacharoff, “Creating Convergence: 
Debiasing Biased Litigants”, 22 L. and Soc. Inquiry (1997) 913, p. 916 (“many researchers 
have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to mitigate various biases by informing subjects about 
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264. For a brief review of the impact of this intervention on various biases see id., p. 916.
265. Id., pp. 918-920 (estimates of “plaintiffs” and “defendants” in the debiasing condition 
showing a smaller discrepancy, and negotiating pairs exhibiting a much smaller rate of 
bargaining impasse).
debiasing paints a complex picture, showing that debiasing interventions may be more 
effective in some areas than in others. One would not be surprised to find, for instance,
that some motivational biases can be reduced through the provision of appropriate 
performance incentives that produce a countervailing, anti-bias, motivation, while the 
debiasing of more purely cognitive biases, such as the hindsight bias and other biases 
that result from basic information-processing mechanisms, is far more challenging, 
as the following discussion illustrates. Even where successful debiasing is possible, 
moreover, it usually requires significant interventions.262
For example, the least intrusive form of debiasing – namely, alerting decision 
makers of the existence of biases – is largely unhelpful.263 On the other hand, 
requiring experimental participants to question their own judgments by considering 
counterarguments appears to be effective in reducing some biases and eliminating 
others.264 In the area of egocentric (“self-serving”) biases, for example, experimental 
participants taking the roles of a plaintiff and a defendant in a tort case exhibited a 
significantly reduced bias when informed about the bias and instructed to consider the
weaknesses of their own case.265 
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268. See: Jolls and Sunstein (supra note 71) pp. 201-202 (drawing a distinction between 
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for the courtroom. The debiasing procedures that psychologists have found to be 
partly successful surpass the traditional techniques that courts use to control jury 
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270. Supra note 268.
On the other hand, in the case of the hindsight bias, debiasing has proven more 
difficult. Not only simple instruction about the bias but even multiple trials with
performance feedback do not appear to reduce this bias. More extreme interventions – 
such as asking participants if they would have been able to explain alternative 
outcomes, to make notes in advance and consult them before making their judgments, 
to provide reasons for their probability assessments, and more – have been able to 
reduce, but not eliminate this bias.266 
From a legal perspective, debiasing can take various forms, each with its own 
advantages, disadvantages, and limitations. For instance, the law could attempt to 
debias egocentric litigants by instructing judges to use their discretion in pre-trial 
conferences, which are meant to facilitate settlement, to encourage litigants to examine 
the weaknesses of their respective cases.267 Such debiasing through procedural law268 
may be attempted for other decision errors as well. However, the strong interventions 
needed for accomplishing a significant debiasing effect in most cases, such as those
described for the hindsight bias, simply may not be practicable in a real litigation 
setting.269
Alternatively, the law may attempt to debias decision makers through its substantive 
rules in different legal areas.270 For instance, legal scholars have recently advocated 
modifications of consumer safety law, such as mandating disclosures in the form of
vivid, concrete, instances as opposed to abstract, general statements, to combat the 
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by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral”, 85 Harv. L. Rev. (1972) 1089. 
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the facilitation of efficient trades, but also on the degree to which the effect reflects a real
value and welfare increase for owners, as noted by Rachlinski and Jourden, id., p. 1576. 
274. See: Jolls and Sunstein (supra note 71) pp. 222-224 (endowment effect reduction). Cf. 
Tor (supra note 16) pp. 522-523 (suggesting such a difference may lead diversifying 
firms to exhibit more rational decisions regarding entry into new markets compared to
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underestimation of certain product risks due to overoptimism.271 Similarly, protecting 
legal entitlements by a liability rule (under which entitlements may be taken with 
compensation), as opposed to a property rule (which prevents the taking of entitlements 
without the owner’s consent),272 may reduce owners’ endowment effect with regard 
to these entitlements and facilitate efficient trades.273 In fact, some substantive
laws may already fulfill a debiasing function. For example, corporate law rules that
provide ready-made default arrangements for the conduct of business activity within 
firms, in addition to reducing transaction costs, may also assist in debiasing business
decision making. Placing management in the hands of professionals with a limited 
personal stake, for example, may diminish the impact of both the endowment effect 
and optimistic biases on corporate decisions compared to those made in an owner-
manager’s business.274 
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B. Second-Order Gaps: A Multiplicity of Phenomena
Second-order gaps, which concern the relationships of different decision processes, may 
also limit the efficacy of the behavioral analysis of law in some cases. Basic behavioral
research efforts are directed largely at discovering specific decision phenomena and
their underlying psychological processes. Once these basic phenomena are established 
and understood, however, second-order questions, such as what happens when 
different processes co-occur – whether they compete with, reinforce, contradict each 
other, or otherwise interact with one another – receive far less attention.275
The priorities of legal analysts, on the other hand, are almost the exact opposite 
of those exhibited by basic decision researchers. When basing legal analysis on 
behavioral insights, scholars are concerned predominantly with how decision makers 
actually operate in complex, legally relevant, real-world environments. Knowing, for 
instance, that people frequently rely on the availability heuristic to make frequency 
judgments under uncertainty is important, and understanding its boundary conditions 
is legally informative.276 However, if decision makers may use another heuristic, 
such as representativeness, to make similar judgments the analyst faces a second-
order challenge: he must determine the circumstances in which availability and 
representativeness may both be relevant; whether the two phenomena may lead to 
different judgments; whether and when decision makers are likely to use one rather 
than the other; and finally, whether the two heuristics may sometimes co-occur and
what the consequences of such a co-occurrence may be.
Scholars evaluating the behavioral approach sometimes find second-order gaps
daunting, lamenting the multiplicity of phenomena that could be applied in a given 
case and the difficulty of determining their ultimate behavioral effects.277 Nevertheless,
and despite the limited amount of direct second-order research, the extant literature 
already provides a number of important insights that may help the analyst divide, if not 
completely conquer, the second-order challenge.
First, a careful examination of the empirical evidence will often reveal an apparent 
second-order problem to be illusory, showing an allegedly conflicting phenomenon
to be irrelevant in the particular case.278 Second, in less extreme cases, potentially 
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281. Supra notes 173-174 and the accompanying text.
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conflicting phenomena may differ in magnitude or scope such that one may reasonably
be expected to dominate the other. Third, at times the analysis will show the conflict
to concern a legal policy application rather than the underlying decision processes.279 
Ultimately, however, there are circumstances where different phenomena, of a similar 
magnitude, may truly co-occur and generate conflicting effects. On such occasions
theoretical applications may be insufficient and direct experimental tests may be
necessary before sound policy recommendations can be made. 
The case of liquidated damages (LD) for breach of contract illustrates both the 
apparent challenge of a second-order gap and how it can be bridged. Some contract 
law scholars in the United States have relied on evidence of overoptimism to counter 
the typical efficiency-based criticism of judicial intervention, ex-post, in LD clauses
that lead to severe outcomes following breach.280 According to this behaviorally 
informed view, LD clauses might merit close scrutiny by the courts since contracting 
parties who are overoptimistic about their performance prospects will underestimate 
the likelihood of breach and may therefore mistakenly agree, ex-ante, to excessive 
damages.281 
Others have countered that a conflicting behavioral phenomenon of ambiguity
aversion suggests the need for judicial deference to LD clauses rather than their close 
scrutiny.282 They argue that decision makers, who tend to prefer well defined risks to
ambiguous ones, may include LD clauses in their agreements to avoid the ambiguous 
consequences of unspecified expectation damages. These scholars assert that in the
LD case two behavioral phenomena conflict, with overoptimism leading contracting
parties to pay insufficient attention to LD on the one hand, and ambiguity aversion
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Competition and Knowledge in the Ellsberg Task”, 16 J. Behav. Dec. Mak. (2003) 181.
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290. This will not always be the case, however. For instance, standard-form contracts may 
contain LD clauses that consumers accept as a default. 
directing them especially to focus on these clauses on the other.283 If this were the case, 
the second-order conflict would require the legal analyst to weigh up the two effects,
determining whether to counsel greater intervention in LD due to overoptimism or to 
support a contrary, deferential, judicial approach based on ambiguity aversion.284 
However, a closer look reveals that this second-order conundrum may be largely 
illusory. Overoptimism is pervasive, if not universal.285 In the contract formation 
context, moreover, where personal stakes are often significant and parties tend to
focus on contract performance and success, overoptimism is likely to be strong, as 
well as reinforced by a number of related phenomena.286 Ambiguity aversion, on the 
other hand, concerns individuals’ preference for well defined risks over ambiguous
ones, when both alternatives are available, but it is largely comparative, not preventing 
decision makers from routinely engaging in behavior with ambiguous consequences.287 
Furthremore, recent evidence suggests that the cooperative nature of the contract 
formation environment is likely further to diminish ambiguity aversion.288 All in all, 
therefore, the application of extant first-order evidence to the LD context indicates
that the concerns about a second-order conflict between overoptimism and ambiguity
aversion are overstated.
The LD case also highlights another way in which careful attention to the 
empirical nature of behavioral findings may reveal an apparent second-order conflict
as deceptive, this time in the case of the status-quo bias.289 Many contracts do not 
contain LD provisions, suggesting that parties who include such clauses in their 
agreements have found them important. Otherwise, the status-quo bias likely would 
have made these parties retain the default contract law regime, which contains no LD 
provisions.290 The status quo bias, therefore, seems to suggest that parties who include 
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LD in their contracts are likely to do so consciously, after considering the possibility 
of breach, thereby providing another argument against ex-post judicial intervention 
in liquidated damages clauses.291 However, the evidence on the processes underlying 
overoptimistic judgments suggests this conclusion may be premature. Overoptimism 
results from a combination of motivational and cognitive processes, the latter having 
only little do with the amount of effort invested by the parties.292 Consequently, the 
increased motivation and effort of parties who overcome the status-quo bias and 
incorporate LD provisions in their contracts are unlikely to vitiate the cognitive (as 
opposed to the motivational) causes of their overoptimistic judgments.293
Finally, the LD debate also provides an example of an apparent second-order conflict
between behavioral phenomena that, in fact, only concerns potentially contradictory 
legal applications. Critics of judicial intervention in LD provisions have suggested 
that judges overestimate the ability of parties to predict future damages, at the time 
of contracting, due to the hindsight bias. They argue that this overestimation of ex-
ante predictability leads judges to undervalue the importance of LD for contracting 
parties, and therefore excessively to refuse their enforcement.294 Judicial hindsight 
bias has thus been marshaled as a phenomenon that counters contracting parties’ 
overoptimism. Here as well, however, the “conflicting” phenomena clearly operate
on different legal actors, at different stages of the contract’s life-cycle. In other words, 
a finding showing that judges refuse LD enforcement due to the hindsight bias might
merit modification of LD doctrine, but it will not justify disregard of the biases that
parties may exhibit at the time of contracting. Judicial hindsight bias and contracting 
parties’ overoptimism may thus generate potentially conflicting policy prescriptions
– a conflict that the design of appropriate legal rules can avoid – but leave no genuine
behavioral ambiguity.
C. Institutional Gaps: Content and Context Effects
The third significant cluster of gaps between basic behavioral research and legal
applications concerns the impact of social institutions on human judgment and 
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decision making. Traditionally, the great majority of empirical research focused on 
studying general patterns of behavior that are not limited to concrete institutional 
settings.295 This approach is reflected, for instance, in the prevalence of studies that use
tasks involving monetary gambles to study judgment and choice.296 The legal scholar, 
on the other hand, predominantly examines behavior that takes place within various 
social institutions, including the law itself; social norms; markets; organizations; and 
more. Consequently, the scholar must consider whether these and other institutions 
exert any systematic effects on legal actors’ decision processes that may lead to 
different behaviors from those otherwise predicted.297
Specifically, institutions may impact decision behavior by providing decision tasks
with both content and context.298 The following sections examine these two distinct 
types of influence, illustrating their effects through the notions of law as content
and markets as context, respectively. These illustrations highlight the importance of 
content and context alike, showing that the extant empirical literature is informative, 
yet leaves significant gaps that merit further study of institutional effects.
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the complex effects of surface structure on risk attitudes). 
Social, economic, and legal institutions provide differential content to decision 
tasks with a similar “deep,” underlying, logical structure.299 For instance, people 
face the need to make similar choices under uncertainty in the social (“What should I 
wear for this party?”), economic (“When should I sell this stock?), and legal (“Should 
I contest this traffic ticket?”) domains. Normatively, each of these choices similarly
requires an assessment of the potential outcomes of different alternatives and their 
associated probabilities, followed by a choice among these alternatives based on one’s 
preexisting preferences regarding the relative attractiveness of the respective outcome-
by-probability combinations.300
Notwithstanding their normative comparability, evidence shows that the same 
decision makers sometimes employ different decision strategies, even exhibit different 
preferences, when faced with structurally similar tasks in different content domains.301 
This is clearly the case where the domain of choice impacts participants’ social 
preferences, as revealed by studies showing that participants exhibit a significantly
more competitive or cooperative behavior in the same game, depending on its labeling 
as the “Wall Street Game” or the “Community Game.”302
Other studies show, moreover, that the content domain also can impact decision 
processes directly, beyond the effect it exerts by shaping preferences. For instance, 
one study that compared similar decisions in four different domains – legal, academic, 
financial, and a simple gamble – found that participants tended to rely on different
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considerations in torts); Cass R. Sunstein, “Moral Heuristics”, 28 Behav. and Brain 
Sci. (2005) 531 (role of moral thinking in a variety of legal domains); Tor, Gazal-Ayal 
and Garcia (supra note 139) (importance of moral considerations in determining the 
willingness to accept plea offers).
strategies altogether in the different domains.303 Consequently, participants showed the 
greatest risk seeking, on average, in a scenario involving a small investment in stocks; 
approximate risk neutrality regarding both academic and traffic ticket decisions; and
high risk aversion when faced with a casino-like gamble.304 Further analyses revealed 
these differential risk attitudes existed despite participants’ nearly identical valuations 
of the alternative outcomes in the different domains, and were related to their use 
of different strategies in these different domains. In the case of an academic grade 
decision, for example, they all relied on numerical considerations, but a morality-
based strategy was the most popular in the legal domain.305
In fact, the notion that the legal institutional setting increases decision makers’ 
attention to and use of morality-related considerations is not surprising, given the 
centrality of these considerations in the popular view of the law. A recent study 
highlights this point, finding that laypeople consider morality-based factors of primary
importance when evaluating a breach of contract.306 These participants found breach 
to be morally wrong even when the breaching party paid full damages; levied damages 
at a level higher than expectation value; indicated specific performance should be
legally enforced; and imposed higher damages in profitable “efficient breach” cases
than when a party breached to avoid a loss.307 Furthermore, the increased role of moral 
considerations in legally related decision making extends well beyond contract law, 
with evidence on morality-driven judgments in tort law, criminal law, and other legal 
areas.308
Of course, the evidence of the effects of law as content on decision making is 
neither limited to the centrality of morality-related considerations nor universal, but 
it tells the legal scholar a cautionary tale. At the very least, when making behavioral-
legal claims, one should not automatically assume that evidence from morally-neutral 
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315. See, e.g., Payne, Bettman and Johnson (supra note 18) pp. 3-4; Phillip E. Tetlock, “An 
content domains, such as simple monetary gambles, fully applies to morally laden 
domains, such as remedies for breach of contract. The problem with such applications 
is illustrated by a recent study that found default remedies for breach of contract 
to have almost no effect on participants’ choice of contract.309 That study, which 
closely adhered to the conventions of experimental economics, purported to examine 
contractual behavior by manipulating choices over color-coded gambles. As I point out 
in more detail elsewhere, however, these gambles were devoid of the very institutional 
and legal context that define a real-world contract, remedy, or default rule,310 and thus
of limited relevance for contract law scholarship.
Hence, the impact of law as content on decision processes provides an additional 
role for those direct empirical tests described above.311 Many such studies test 
theoretical behavioral propositions, implicitly examining, inter alia, whether specific
legal institutions – such as litigation, legal rights, or contracting – impact human 
decision processes in ways that limit the applicability of established behavioral 
findings that were generated outside these institutional settings.
Importantly, beyond the effect they exert in providing content to legal decision 
making, institutions also provide the context within which such judgment and choice 
take place. Institutional context shapes decision processes in multiple ways, defining
both the environment and the nature of the decision task. In fact, one of the main 
insights of judgment and decision research concerns the context-dependent character 
of human decision processes.312 For instance, the extensive evidence on framing effects 
reveals how decision frames and reference points – which often are determined by the 
decision context – shape risk preferences, as evinced in the Asian disease example.313 
This context is commonly provided by the institutional environment of the decision 
task, such as when default rules of contract law provide a reference point for judging 
alternative contractual arrangements.314
In addition to structuring the decision task, institutional context provides an 
environment that impacts decision behavior. Environmental effects take place, for 
example, when people make decisions they are accountable for – that is, decisions 
they expect they may be called to justify to others – a common characteristic of legal, 
political, and organizational decision making.315 In the legal domain, for example, trial 
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court judges know their decisions may be reviewed later by an appellate court. The 
effects of accountability are complex, tending to increase attention to and effort in the 
decision process, with a more mixed effect on decision quality.316 
Other institutional contexts that impact legally relevant behavior include groups 
and organizations, to name but two pervasive examples. Commonly, these institutions 
shape many characteristics of decision tasks, providing reference points and frames, 
incentives, information, and more. They also define the decision environment,
through the social forces of group or organizational membership, roles, and the 
like.317 In a series of experiments this Author and colleagues found, for example, 
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that participants behaved more cooperatively towards members of their own group 
in decisions involving comparisons with other groups than in decisions involving 
identical comparisons that concerned only members of their own group. However, 
these findings were pronounced only for individuals who self-categorized as group
members and identified with this categorization.318
Yet despite the pervasive presence of these institutions in legal settings and the 
significant body of basic research studying them, legal scholars have directed only
limited attention to their behavioral effects. The extant research, insofar as it exists, 
focuses on the group level, most notably concerning the specific case of jury decision
making.319
The impact of markets as context powerfully illustrates the legal significance of
institutions. Much legally relevant behavior occurs in market settings, implicating 
doctrinal areas ranging from contract and tort to corporate, securities, antitrust, 
consumer protection, labor, tax law and more. Understanding the impact of markets 
on decision behavior is thus especially important, particularly in light of the common 
reliance of many law and economics scholars on the ability of markets to eliminate 
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judgmental biases and decision errors.320 For this reason even some behaviorally-
oriented scholars have been too quick to concede that bounded rationality is of limited 
relevance in market settings.321
Markets are said to eliminate the effects of boundedly rational behavior through 
a number of mechanisms:322 first, competitive selection should eliminate boundedly
rational market participants, who will underperform, ultimately fail, and exit the 
market. Second, because erroneous decisions in markets are costly, decision makers 
will learn to correct them. Third, shrewd rational arbitrageurs will identify the mistaken 
decisions of boundedly rational market participants, exploit and profit from them, until
all such opportunities – and their concomitant decision errors – are eliminated. Finally, 
even if boundedly rational behavior survives it is of no import when markets perform 
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accurate and immediate feedback about the relation between the situational 
conditions and the appropriate response. The necessary feedback is often 
lacking for decisions made by managers, entrepreneurs, and politicians 
because (i) outcomes are commonly de-layed and not easily attributable to 
a particular action; (ii) variability in the environment degrades the reliability 
of the feedback, especially where outcomes of low probability are involved; 
in the aggregate “as if” participants were rational, as will happen if individual errors 
are randomly distributed.
However, a closer look at these mechanisms on the one hand and the behavioral 
evidence on the other reveals the limited ability of markets to eliminate boundedly 
rational behavior. For instance, competitive selection will only eliminate some 
boundedly rational behavior, and may, on the contrary, even exacerbate some of its 
effects, as illustrated by the case of overoptimistic entry into markets.323 Economic 
evidence reveals the prevalence of excess entry into markets, especially by startup 
entrants. Behavioral evidence, in turn, suggests that this excess entry is driven by 
entrants’ overoptimistic predictions regarding their future performance prospects. Of 
course, not all entrants are overoptimistic, but the large proportion of overoptimistic 
entrants diminishes the survival prospects of their rational counterparts as well, and 
leads to an overrepresentation of the boundedly rational among the ranks of those 
ultimately successful entrants. The case of new entry thus illustrates the limited ability 
of competitive discipline to eliminate boundedly rational behavior from markets.
An examination of the other rationality-inducing market mechanisms reveals 
their limitations as well. The learning argument, for example, assumes that market 
participants are able to identify their mistakes, associate them with specific
consequences, and proceed to correct them. These assumptions, however, are rarely 
met in legally relevant market settings, where decisions are made under uncertainty; 
outcomes are delayed and feedback is limited and noisy; and there is often no reliable 
information about the outcomes that would have occurred had a different choice been 
made. Furthermore, many significant decisions are unique or at least infrequent, and
thus provide very little opportunity for learning.324
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The arbitrage argument is severely limited as well. Arbitrage requires a sufficiently
large group of actors who are able both to identify opportunities and to exploit them 
by selling to or buying from those biased, boundedly rational, market participants. 
These arbitrageurs also need substitutes for the products they trade with the boundedly 
rational, and must be able to bear the risk involved in their arbitrage efforts. In fact, 
because of these limitations, empirical evidence shows that arbitrage is limited even in 
developed financial markets.325
Similarly, the “as if” argument is of limited import in the case of bounded 
rationality, for two reasons: first, because decision processes often lead to systematic,
unidirectional, deviations from rational action, mistaken judgments and decisions will 
not cancel each other out on average, in the aggregate. Second, the law is frequently 
concerned with individual behavior, even in the context of markets. This is clearly the 
case in areas such as consumer protection or securities regulation, where legal rules 
may be especially concerned with boundedly rational actors, their exploitation by 
others and their effects on markets. But it may also be the case in areas such as torts or 
contracts, where the law may seek to lead contracting parties and potential tortfeasors, 
rational and boundedly rational alike, to efficient outcomes.
The mechanisms of market discipline thus clearly serve to reduce the manifestation 
of boundedly rational behavior in economic settings, but frequently they are unlikely 
to eradicate it altogether. This conclusion, which is based on a direct examination 
of the asserted disciplinary mechanisms, is also corroborated by the extensive field
evidence that scholars in behavioral economics and behavioral finance have amassed
in recent decades. Boundedly rational market behavior appears prevalent not only for 
consumer behavior, housing markets, or labor markets, but also in financial markets
and even among sophisticated, experienced, participants in these markets.326 
All in all, therefore, the impact of markets as a context that shapes human behavior 
must be taken into account by behaviorally oriented scholars. And while a further 
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close study of specific legal questions is clearly needed, the extant evidence indicates
that behavioral findings from non-market settings are neither irrelevant nor always
applicable where market behavior is concerned. 
V. Normative Neutrality and Normative Relevance
The fourth and final general proposition this Article develops is that the behavioral
analysis of law is simultaneously normatively neutral and normatively relevant. It is 
normatively neutral because it is not committed to any specific legal goal or value
system.327 In this sense, the behavioral approach is fundamentally different from 
normatively committed legal methodologies, such as the economic analysis of law 
or rights-based theories. At most, the behavioral analysis of law may be committed to 
the instrumental value of integrating empirical evidence on human behavior into legal 
analysis, where relevant. However, the essential normative neutrality of the behavioral 
approach does not make it normatively irrelevant, but rather turns it into a useful tool 
for scholars of varied normative persuasions. Behavioral insights – when coupled with 
other, normative, legal approaches – clearly may assist in the normative evaluation of 
the law. This Part therefore first explains the neutrality claim, then turns to examine
in some detail when behavioral findings in conjunction with the normative economic
standard of social welfare328 truly provide a justification for legal interventions and
what form such interventions should take.
A. Normative Neutrality
The normative neutrality claim is manifested in the present definition of the behavioral
approach as the application of empirical behavioral evidence to legal analysis, which 
includes no normative component; it is also reflected in the different legal applications
offered throughout this Article. In some cases, behavioral findings were shown capable
of advancing traditional legal goals such as justice or fairness. For example, evidence 
of the hindsight bias raised concerns that courts may hold liable in negligence people 
who have taken reasonable care, and thus justified a more careful evaluation of the
degree to which the legal system addresses the prevalent challenge of judgments in 
hindsight;329 findings on judgments by representativeness provided a new explanation
of the evidence law rule that generally holds character evidence inadmissible in a 
criminal trial;330 and compromise effects in choice behavior revealed the impact of 
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337. E.g., Shavell (supra note 5) pp. 595-598 (providing a brief, clear explanation of the notions 
of individual utility and social welfare). For a more extensive exposition see: Louis Kaplow 
and Sreven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2002) pp. 15-38. See also the different and 
much contested approach to the normative foundation of the economic approach to law 
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seemingly irrelevant alternatives on the categorization of criminal offenses, to name 
some examples.331 
In many of the other applications offered here, on the other hand, behavioral insights 
were used to examine the efficiency of legal rules and institutions – that is, to conduct a
behavioral law and economics analysis.332 For instance, evidence of availability biases 
was used to advance the model of optimal deterrence in criminal law;333 findings on the
endowment effect and the status-quo bias necessitated a reexamination of the Coase 
theorem and the efficient allocation of entitlements, as well as the appropriate design
of default rules;334 and various behavioral phenomena were integrated in the efficiency
analysis of liquidated damages doctrine.335 The two sets of examples – of analyses 
seeking to promote justice or fairness on the one hand and those that are efficiency-
oriented on the other – thus highlight the normative neutrality claim, showing how 
behavioral insights can be of service to these and other normatively committed legal 
approaches.336 
Moreover, a comparison of the behavioral approach to its economic counterpart 
further clarifies the normative neutrality claim. The economic approach retains the
standard normative commitment of economics to social welfare, a term that connotes 
some form of aggregation (e.g. addition, as suggested by utilitarian theory) of the 
utilities or well-being of individuals in society.337 Based on this normative foundation, 
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and decisions that more closely approximate the normative standards of rationality, most 
typically the concern of JDM researchers with the ways in which actual behavior deviates 
from standards of rationality is driven largely by a desire to understand the nature of 
human behavior, not by a commitment to any particular normative standard or outcome. 
Cf. Rachlinski, “New” Law and Psychology (supra note 13) p. 753 (explaining that 
behavioral analyses may not present a clear normative position since “behavioral decision 
theory is the study of how the human mind operates, not the study of how humans should 
behave ...”). 
340. Various factors, which are outside our present scope, may explain the great impact of 
behavioral insights on the economic analysis of law on the one hand, and the centrality 
of behavioral law and economics among the various behavioral-legal applications. 
Regardless of its reasons, however, this significant overlap has led some scholars
mistakenly to identify behavioral law and economics as the only behavioral approach to 
law. But see, e.g., Rachlinski (supra note 13) pp. 764-765 (offering a broad definition of
the behavioral approach that is not normatively committed other than, possibly, to the 
reduction of human error). 
the economic analysis of law then engages in normative legal analyses that evaluate 
the desirability of the law from a social welfare perspective.338 In contrast, behavioral 
decision research engages in the descriptive enterprise of understanding human 
behavior and identifying its psychological underpinnings, rather than in any normative 
effort.339 Consequently, the behavioral approach retains its predominantly descriptive, 
normatively neutral, nature when informing legal analyses.
Put differently, the behavioral approach is normatively neutral standing on its 
own. In that basic state, however, it can hardly generate any meaningful normative 
evaluations of the law since those require some measure of value. Once coupled with 
other legal approaches – either explicitly or implicitly – it becomes a most useful and 
necessary instrument for legal scholars of various persuasions. 
In practice, however, a very large proportion of those behaviorally informed legal 
analyses in recent years may be categorized as behavioral law and economics.340 
Moreover, even the most superficial review of the literature reveals a pro-intervention
trend, where behavioral law and economics analyses recommending legal 
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341. E.g., Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell, “Government Regulation of Irrationality: 
Moral and Cognitive Hazards”, 90 Minn. L. Rev. (2006) 1620, pp. 1620-1621 (asserting 
that behavioral evidence is increasingly used to “justify restrictions on market and 
nonmarket transactions).; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, 
and Paternalism”, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. (2006) 207, pp. 224-225 (noting that behavioral 
findings most commonly used to support paternalistic interventions) [“Individual
Differences”].
342. For representative positions in the debate see: Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, 
O’donoghue and Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives (supra note 336) pp. 1211, 1218 
(“The scientific consolidation of psychological findings into a new brand of behavioral
economic theory breathes new life into the rationales for paternalistic regulation ... The 
challenge is figuring out what sorts of “idiotic” behaviors are likely to arise routinely
and how to prevent them, while imposing minimal restrictions on those who behave 
rationally”); Edward L. Glaeser, “Paternalism and Psychology”, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
(2006) 133 (arguing that bounded rationality creates a greater problem for government 
due to problems of incentives and capture and therefore militates against paternalism); 
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) p. 1541 (arguing the behavioral evidence at 
least supports anti-antipaternalism); Klick and Mitchell (supra note 342) pp. 1622-1627 
(arguing that paternalistic interventions are problematic since they inhibit individuals’ 
motivation and ability to learn and correct errors in the long run); Mitchell (supra note 336) 
(arguing that behavioral findings do not make paternalism inevitable, that one could use
liberty rather than welfare to guide paternalistic interventions, and more); Posner (supra 
note 261) p. 1575 (arguing that behavioral findings apply to government bureaucrats
equally and therefore do not justify intervention, except possibly in the form of debiaing); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism”, 97 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. (2003) 1165, p. 1168 [hereinafter “Uncertain Paternalism”] (“The psychological 
case for paternalism, however, must rest on a relative assessment of the cognitive costs 
of improved decision against the costs of supplanting individual choice”); Rachlinski, 
Individual Differences (supra note 342) (arguing that taking individual differences into 
account requires are more careful approach to behaviorally-based interventions); Sunstein 
and Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism (supra note 339) (arguing that it is both possible and 
desirable for private and public institutions to influence behavior in welfare-promoting
ways without eliminating freedom of choice).
interventions far outweigh those counseling against them.341 This trend in turn has 
fueled a controversy among scholars on whether behavioral findings – which generally
emphasize human error and limitation – truly justify paternalistic intervention, and 
what form such interventions, if and where justified, should take.342 The remainder of
this Part therefore focuses on the behavioral approach to law and economics, whose 
normative analyses are based on the social welfare criterion. 
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343. The costs generated by such errors have been dubbed “internalities” by some researchers, 
suggesting an analogy to those negative externalities that occur when the behavior of one 
actor negatively affects the well-being of other individuals, which may justify welfare 
increasing, interventions. See Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and Rabin, 
Regulation for Conservatives (supra note 336) p. 1221 (“When consumers make errors, 
it is as they are imposing externalities on themselves because the decisions they make ... 
do not accurately reflect the benefit they derive”). For an even more extreme variant of
this argument see: Colin F. Camerer, “Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and 
Paternalism”, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. (2006) 87, p. 92 (suggesting that neuroscience evidence 
on the existence of different systems for recording liking, expressing wanting, and for 
learning to want what the brain likes may provide a basis for paternalistic corrections that 
produce choices that are not wanted but will be liked later, if these interventions do not 
cause much harm to rational agents). The law and economics literature on externalities 
is extensive. See generally: Shavell (supra note 5) pp. 77-109 (defining externalities and
their resolution in the context of property rights). See also Steven Shavell, “The Optimal 
Structure of Law Enforcement”, 36 J. L. and Econ. (1993) 255, pp. 261-270 (a comparative 
analysis of different methods of intervention aimed to control undesirable behavior). 
344. These preferences, however, are “true” only in limited the sense of reflecting the choices
these individuals would have made had they possessed an accurate estimate of the risks 
and benefits of products, not taking into account the many other environmental variables
that may contribute to the construction of preferences.
345. See: Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and Rabin, Regulation for 
Conservatives (supra note 336) p. 1221 (making the argument from internalities). 
346. See, e.g., Rachlinski, Uncertain Paternalism (supra note 343) pp. 1177-1135 (reviewing 
similar pro-intervention arguments in a variety of legal contexts).
B. Normative Relevance
From the perspective of social welfare, when systematic decision errors diminish 
decision makers’ individual welfare, interventions aimed at reducing or eliminating 
these errors may be socially beneficial.343 For example, when people who underestimate
product risks over-consume, or when those who underestimate product benefits
purchase too little, interventions could increase welfare by better aligning consumers’ 
decisions with their true344 preferences.345 This error–intervention connection is 
manifested in studies calling for ex-post interventions in some contractual terms that 
may reflect systematic biases of contracting parties; the imposition of increased tort
liability and additional regulation of behavior involving financial, health and safety
risks to error-prone consumers; and more.346
Of course, behavioral findings may well justify such interventions, but a closer
look suggests that compelling behaviorally based interventions should rest on more 
than mere proof of some systematic deviation from strict rationality in a concrete 
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347. Supra Parts II, III, and IV respectively.
348. Cf. Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and Rabin, Regulation for 
Conservatives (supra note 336) pp. 1217-1218 (arguing that debiasing self control 
problems and judgmental errors can produce welfare gains). Of course, this may not 
always be the case even with respect to judgmental biases. For instance, overoptimism may 
serve as a motivating force that people value despite its biasing effect on their judgments. 
Some biases, moreover, may also ameliorate the effects of other, conflicting, decision
errors, and their elimination may therefore ultimately prove welfare reducing. See, e.g., 
Keren Shapira-Ettinger and Ron A Shapira, “The Constructive Value of Overconfidence”,
(October 10, 2007). Bar Ilan University, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Available at SSRN: [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079762] (making this type of argument 
with respect to overoptimism).
349. See, e.g., id., However, economists have long debated whether even welfare-based 
analyses should sometimes exclude certain social sources of well-being, such as envy or 
spite, or the more extreme case of an individual who derives pleasure from inflicting pain
on others. Of course, a pure welfarist standard would not exclude any sources of individual 
welfare. See, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell (supra note 337) pp. 18-19 (noting that the notion 
of individuals’ well-being used in welfare economics is comprehensive, and includes 
anything individuals might value, such that “[t]he only limit on what is included in well-
being is to be found in the minds of individuals themselves, not in the minds of analysts.”) 
(reference omitted).
legal setting. First, a convincing pro-intervention argument must satisfy the general 
requirements of the behavioral analysis of law: it should draw on robust empirical 
evidence of behavioral regularities; take into account their boundary conditions; and 
consider the policy implications of the various research gaps identified above.347
Second, the paternalistically oriented argument should distinguish among different 
categories of deviations from normative standards of rationality, most notably between 
deviations in the domain of judgment and deviations in the domain of choice, which 
possess different normative characteristics. Decision makers are likely to view 
judgmental deviations as simple mistakes, errors that they would be happy to correct. 
Successful interventions that aim to debias such errors or reduce their negative 
impact on behavior are more likely to make people better off, generating real welfare 
gains.348 
In the domain of choice (or preferences), on the other hand, the justification for
intervention is more limited and problematic. For one, some deviations from typical 
standards of rational action – such as social preferences, where individuals’ utility 
depends on the outcomes received by other people – may comprise valuable, valid, 
preferences. Choice “deviations” due to such social preferences are therefore unlikely 
to justify paternalism.349 
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350. E.g., Posner (supra note 5) p. 7 (describing the principle and stating its importance). 
351. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes, “The Psychology of Waste”, 9 J. Behav. Dec. Mak. (1996) 213 
(showing the role of waste concerns in the effect); Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer, 
“The Psychology of Sunk Cost”, 35 Org. Behav. and Hum. Dec. Proc. (1985) 124 
(describing the basic phenomenon and examining variables that facilitate and inhibit it); 
Richard P. Larrick, James N. Morgan and Richard E. Nisbett, “Teaching the Use of Cost-
Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life”, 1 Psych. Sci. (1990) 362, p. 363 (attributing the
effect to an overgeneralization of the “don’t waste” rule). Barry M. Staw, “The Escalation 
of Commitment to a Course of Action”, 6 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. (1981) 577 (describing the 
basic phenomenon and examining variables that facilitate and inhibit it).
352. See: Dawes (supra note 15) pp. 500-502 (debating whether accounting for sunk costs 
should be counted irrational, citing the above factors as well additional organizational 
considerations). Taking sunk costs into account may also provide a reasonable choice 
heuristic for many everyday situations where past investment do reasonably predict future 
benefits. See: Hal R. Arkes and Peter Ayton, “The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are
Humans Less Rational Than Lower Animals?”, 125 Psych. Bull. (1999) 591 (suggesting 
the possible utility of such a heuristic).
353. See supra notes 87-96 and the accompanying text.
Other preferences that do not accord with strict rationality but may sometimes 
be utility-maximizing also provide only a tenuous basis for intervention. Standard 
economic analysis makes clear, for instance, that “sunk” (incurred) costs should not 
impact future behavior, which should be based on forward-looking considerations 
alone.350 That one has already invested, say, $10,000,000 in a project thus should 
have no bearing on the question of whether the project ought to be completed at 
an additional cost of $1,000,000. Instead, the project should be completed if its net 
present value – based on predictions of future performance – is positive. Otherwise, 
the project should not be completed, the sunk fortune notwithstanding. Behavioral 
research provides evidence, however, that decision makers are sometimes affected by 
sunk costs, “throwing good money after bad.”351 Such preferences that take sunk costs 
into account – although contrary to the theory of rational action – may be rational from 
the subjective perspective of the individual decision maker when the disutility of the 
pain incurred by the sunk cost is sufficiently large; when one has a reputation of “being
decisive” or “not wasteful” to protect; when others honor sunk costs and may penalize 
one for not honoring them; and more.352 
Moreover, intervention can be problematic even when choice behavior is clearly 
erroneous, as in the case of framing or context effects.353 In these cases, where decision 
makers exhibit conflicting, inconsistent, or ad hoc constructed preferences, policy
makers face the daunting task of determining “authentic” preferences. This problem 
could be overcome if policy makers were to determine the “correct” preferences 
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354. See, e.g., Rachlinski (supra note 342) pp. 224-226.
355. Assuming these laws hold even in identifiable circumstances where not using a seat belt
poses no risk or cost whatsoever to anybody other than the careless driver. 
356. See, e.g., Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and Rabin, Regulation for 
Conservatives (supra note 336) p. 1214 n. 11. See also: Glaeser (supra note 346) pp. 150-
156 (arguing that soft paternalism generates various costs, including emotional ones).
357. E.g., Klick and Mitchell (supra note 342). 
based on their own values, but such an approach is problematic for those who seek to 
promote social welfare based on individual utility considerations.
Third and importantly, the identification of systematic individual error reveals
a problem, not its solution, since behaviorally based paternalistic interventions may 
be too costly for society to be justified, or simply ineffective. These cost and efficacy
variables are also interrelated, moreover, since cheaper forms of intervention can be 
less effective, while more effective interventions often are more costly. 
Behaviorally based interventions generate a variety of “implementation costs,” 
including both the costs involved in any governmental action and some costs that 
are specific to the behavioral case. Such specific implementation costs include, for
instance:
(1) Interventions that restrict freedom of choice and thus impose 
a cost on those rational citizens who do not err.354 For example, 
laws that require companies to issue certain securities to 
investors only on regulated exchanges reduce the flexibility of
issuers and increase the costs of stock issues to all investors. 
(2) Choice restrictions - such as, say, laws mandating seat belt 
usage355 – may also create a psychic cost for all decision makers 
who value freedom of choice.356 
(3) Insofar as boundedly rational individuals may learn to 
overcome some decision errors if given sufficient incentives
and feedback, moreover, paternalistic interventions that reduce 
feedback and incentives for correction may prevent longer term 
welfare increases due to potential improvements in decision 
quality.357 This particular set of implementation costs is often of 
limited significance, however, given the evidence on the limited
impact of incentives on many decision errors and the limited 
availability of meaningful feedback in most real world settings.
(4) In addition, although also of limited concern, some 
paternalistic interventions may impact consumer demand for 
certain products, occasionally diminishing producer welfare 
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358. But not total welfare – that is, the increase in consumer welfare will not be smaller than the 
decrease in producer welfare. See: Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and 
Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives (supra note 336) p. 1220.
359. See, e.g., Posner (supra note 261) p. 1575.
360. E.g., Korobkin (supra note 110) p. 1267 (suggesting that the endowment effect will 
contribute to making the regulatory status quo resistant to change); Rachlinski and Farina 
(supra note 317) pp. 604-605 (framing effects can explain regulatory stickiness).
361. Glaeser (supra note 343).
362. Rachlinski (supra note 243) p. 1224 (citing disclosure as a less intrusive alternative to 
restrictions on choice); Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein and O’donoghue and Rabin 
(supra note 336) p. 1233 (same).  
363. See, e.g, Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, “Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation”, 112 Harv. L. Rev. (1999) 1420, pp.1451-1455 
(reviewing food manufacturers’ marketing practices), pp. 1467-1502 (providing an 
extensive account of the manipulation efforts of cigarette manufacturers over the years).
(profits).358 This may be the case, for example, if government
advertising campaigns and other regulations reduce consumption 
of hazardous tobacco products.
(5) Finally, a more troubling set of costs concerns the significant
possibility of government error in adopting and implementing 
behaviorally driven interventions359 since in the world of 
governmental decision making, laws and regulations tend to 
be especially sticky.360 The problem of government error may 
be especially acute, moreover, in areas where interested private 
parties have the incentive and means to impact government 
policies.361 
Furthermore, if the hurdles involved in the implementation of behaviorally based 
paternalistic policies were not enough, the efficacy of these policies often will be
(a) limited and (b) inversely related to the degree of intervention they employ. For 
example, the mandatory provision of information about product risks or costs – which is 
frequently required for some consumer goods, health products, financial products, and
more – is thought to reduce judgmental biases without constraining consumer choice.362 
However, not only is mandatory disclosure a debiasing mechanism of limited efficacy,
but it is also a mechanism that could be subject to manipulation by the disclosing 
parties.363 This may happen, for instance, when producers emphasize that certain foods 
are “low fat” – implicitly suggesting they are healthful – and deemphasizing their 
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364. See, e.g, Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and Rabin (supra note 336) p. 
1235 n. 85 (citing sources to this effect).
365. See, e.g., Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 336) pp. 1174-1177. 
366. E.g., id., p. 1175. Note, however, that in some limited circumstances "required active 
choice" provisions may substitute for default rules. See id. pp. 1188-1189.
367. Importantly, however, regulating bodies – their other limitations notwithstanding 
– typically will not be subject to the same errors commonly exhibited by the regulated, 
as suggested by some commentators, since they face different decision problems. 
Government agencies, for instance, often make general rules that concern situations they 
are not personally involved in, both of which factors may improve their decisions; they are 
also repeat players who often possess relevant expertise. See: Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 
(supra note 12) pp. 1543-1545 (arguing that despite government’s limitations, a degree of 
insulation from populist pressures combined with expertise may lead to better decision 
making); Rachlinski and Farina (supra note 317) pp. 558-559 (noting the potential of 
expertise and experience to improve governmental decision making). Cf. also Daniel 
Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective 
on Risk Taking”, 39 Mgmt. Sci. (1993) 17, pp. 25-26 (discussing the difference between 
the “inside view” of actors and the “outside view”). 
368. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar and John A. E. Pottow, “On the Stickiness of Default Rules”, 
33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2006) 651. 
369. Glaeser (supra note 343) pp. 155-156. 
high sugar content.364 Furthermore, the costs of mandatory disclosure – even when 
completely unbiased – inevitably increase the costs of producing the products to which 
they pertain, costs that are imposed on all consumers, biased and unbiased alike.
Other “soft” interventions, such as the design of default rules that benefit biased
decision makers but do not restrict the choices of unbiased ones, may be more effective 
in leading consumers to better choices, but they also generate significant costs.365 For
one, the provision of some default rule may often be unavoidable, since the law would 
want to provide some certainty as to legal outcomes in the absence of specific action
by people.366 The behavioral evidence on the power of defaults suggests, however, 
that an erroneous default-rule choice by the regulator can impose significant costs
on society.367 Moreover, insofar as regulatory errors are bound to occur, their costs 
will not be limited to those boundedly rational decision makers who will remain with 
inefficient defaults. Instead, these defaults will also diminish the welfare of some
rational individuals who, because of the various non-behavioral causes for default 
rule stickiness,368 will remain with the erroneous defaults, their individual rationality 
notwithstanding. In addition, public choice problems may be more severe for regulators 
who consciously account for the behavioral effects of default rules, especially if they 
become adept at manipulating preferences.369
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370. See, e.g., Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 336) p. 1187-1188 (suggesting that cooling-off 
rules may be justified by the bounded rationality and self-control of consumers).
371. Higher prices due to mandatory procedural constraints on choice may also harm some 
boundedly rational consumers whose benefits from the constraints are outweighed by their
costs. Such constraints may even harm sellers (but increase total welfare), see: Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’donoghue and Rabin (supra note 336) p. 1240, although the 
latter sometimes may be able to reduce this harm if they can sort potentially biased from 
unbiased consumers, see: Rachlinski (supra note 342) p. 225.
372. Glaeser (supra note 342) p. 139-141; Klick and Mitchell (supra note 342). 
373. See e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, “Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision 
Making”, Cognitive Progress in Choice and Decision Behavior (Thomas S. Wallsten- ed., 
1980) p. 1 (emphasizing the importance of unambiguous feedback for learning); Richard E. 
Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson and Geoffrey T. Fong, “Improving Inductive 
Inference”, Judgment Under Uncertainty (supra note 32) pp. 445, 445-446 (noting that 
decisionmakers need to know that an error has occurred, how it has occurred, and how to 
improve the decision process). As Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman explain: 
 Effective learning takes place only under certain conditions: it requires 
accurate and immediate feedback about the relation between the situational 
conditions and the appropriate response. The necessary feedback is often 
Similarly, harsher interventions that directly restrict freedom of choice tend to 
be very costly for society. Behaviorally based restrictions on choice may be either 
procedural – as in the case of mandatory cooling off periods for certain consumer 
transactions – or substantive – such as laws that allow overtime work but prevent 
workers from waiving their right to a higher pay for overtime hours. The costs of 
such restrictions on choice, especially for non-biased decision makers, are significant,
and go well beyond the psychic costs of diminished freedom of choice. For example, 
cooling off requirements, which permit boundedly rational consumers to back out 
of some transactions within a certain designated time frame,370 increase the cost of 
products and thereby harm rational consumers.371 In the same vein, substantive choice 
restrictions will sometimes prevent rational decision makers from reaching some 
welfare-increasing bargains. This would be the case, for instance, where a rational 
worker is willing to work overtime for the usual pay, but will not be able to obtain 
overtime work because the employer – who would be willing to offer overtime at 
normal wages – cannot afford to pay the higher, mandatory, pay. 
Finally, restrictions on choice may also eliminate some learning opportunities that 
could reduce decision errors over time.372 This may happen mainly in those limited 
circumstances where decision makers enjoy the conditions necessary for learning, 
including repeat play and the ability to identify mistakes, associate them with specific
judgments or choices, and proceed to correct them.373 These conditions will rarely 
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lacking for decisions made by managers, entrepreneurs, and politicians 
because (i) outcomes are commonly delayed and not easily attributable to 
a particular action; (ii) variability in the environment degrades the reliability 
of the feedback, especially where outcomes of low probability are involved; 
(iii) there is often no information about what the outcome would have been if 
another decision had been taken; and (iv) most important decisions are unique 
and therefore provide little opportunity for learning.
 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions”, 
Rational Choice, (supra note 320) p. 67, 90 (citation omitted).
374. As online markets have already developed. For a review of some such mechanisms and 
their relation to the legal regulation of online consumer transactions see, for instance, 
Shmuel I. Becher and Tal Zarsky, “E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting 
in the Age of Online User Participation”, 14 Mich. Telecom. and Tech L. Rev. 22-36 and n. 
202 (forthcoming 2008). 
375. E.g., Sunstein and Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism (supra note 336) p. 1165. 
376. Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (supra note 12) p. 1545 (noting that “from the perspective of 
behavioral law and economics, issues of paternalism are to a significant degree empirical
questions...”).
occur for most important decisions, but may be relevant in some consumer-protection 
contexts, where a repeat experience with, say, unreliable online merchants may give 
consumers sufficiently focused feedback, together with many opportunities to seek
non-governmental mechanisms for certifying merchant quality.374
All in all, the preceding analysis suggests that the scope for justified and efficacious,
behaviorally based, welfare-increasing, paternalistic interventions is more limited 
than it may appear at first sight. Nevertheless, government intervention is not only
occasionally beneficial, but also frequently unavoidable. As noted above, the legal
system constructs the default background, which frequently provides the starting 
point for various legally relevant judgments and choices. Insofar as these starting 
points impact decision behavior, the government already and inevitably shapes some 
judgments and constructs some preferences.375 Rather than rejecting all paternalistic 
interventions outright, therefore, a further comparative analysis of the merits and 
demerits of the different available policy approaches is required.376
VI. Conclusion 
This Article defined the behavioral analysis of law as the application of empirical
behavioral evidence to the analysis of legal rules and institutions. This definition
helped outline the boundaries of the behavioral approach and some of its central 
methodological features, organized around four themes or propositions. 
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The first proposition asserted that the efficacy of the law often depends on its
accounting for relevant patterns of human behavior, most notably those identified by
behavioral decision scientists and researchers in related areas. In developing this theme, 
Part II reviewed some important behavioral findings, which were divided into the two
central categories of judgment and decision making. The first concerned the ways in
which individuals form and update their beliefs about the surrounding world, while 
the second addressed the means people employ when constructing and expressing 
their preferences for action. Throughout this section, behavioral evidence was put in a 
legal context, such that the potential importance of the described phenomena for legal 
scholarship became apparent.
Part III then argued that the behavioral approach is characterized most clearly 
by its empirical foundations. The emphasis on the empirical link served both more 
clearly to demarcate the boundaries of the behavioral approach and to compare two 
main genres of behavioral-legal research: theoretical applications and direct empirical 
tests. Notably, this comparison suggested that theoretical applications comprise nearly 
all behavioral-legal applications, with only a small minority of studies involving 
direct empirical tests of behavioral questions in legal settings. Their popularity 
notwithstanding, however, this Part showed that compelling theoretical applications 
must be sensitive to the empirical contours of the behavioral phenomena they apply, 
verify their robustness, and make sure that the extant evidence is likely to be externally 
valid in the legal domain as well. On the other hand, the genre of direct empirical tests 
– whether observational tests of legal real-world (“field”) data or experimental studies
in legal settings – avoids some of the problems inherent in theoretical applications of 
non-legal findings, especially in the area of external validity. This genre also provides
extremely valuable means of generating new empirical data on legal questions, where 
such data are often sorely lacking. In many legal domains, however, specific data on
the operation of legal rules and institutions are difficult or impossible to obtain, while
non-legal evidence may prove robust and informative. Overall, therefore, the two 
genres were shown to provide not only alternative approaches but also complementary 
means of addressing behavioral-legal questions.
Part IV developed the third theme, which emphasized a series of challenges to the 
behavioral analysis of law due to a variety of gaps between basic research findings,
which are directed by decision researchers’ priorities and interests, and the needs 
of the behaviorally oriented legal scholar, which are typically different. This Part 
distinguished among shrinking gaps, which exist in basic research areas that in the 
past received less attention from decision researchers but are now increasingly studied; 
second-order gaps, which concern research on the relationships among different 
decision processes; and institutional gaps, which relate to the pervasive, but under-
researched, impact of social institutions on human judgment and decision process. 
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Within each of these three, non-mutually exclusive, categories of gaps, one or two 
important examples were developed in turn, to show how the gaps challenge legal 
scholars and what can be done to overcome them, minimize their negative effect, and 
separate real gaps from imaginary ones.
Part V then addressed the fourth proposition advanced here – namely, that the 
behavioral approach is simultaneously normatively neutral and normatively relevant. 
The normative neutrality claim was emphasized, since recent debates in the legal 
literature sometimes tend to confuse the behavioral approach generally with its 
specific, if most central and noticeable, variant of behavioral law and economics. After
establishing the neutrality claim, the remainder of this Part illustrated the normative 
relevance of the behavioral analysis of law when coupled with other normative 
approaches. Specifically, this Part addressed the current debate among legal scholars
on whether, from the economic perspective of social welfare, behavioral findings tend
to justify paternalistic intervention, concluding with a very qualified “sometimes.”
Weighing the evidence on the costs and benefits of behaviorally based paternalism, this
Part found that justified intervention must overcome many hurdles, beyond providing
mere evidence of human error. However, from a social welfare perspective, such 
interventions may occasionally be beneficial.

